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BARRIERS TO FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
Patricia A. McCoy*
The number of modifications to distressed residential loans following the
2008 financial crisis has been disappointingly low compared to the number of
foreclosures. This raises concerns about the presence of artificial barriers to loan
modifications in situations where foreclosure should be avoidable. There are three
pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to foreclosure prevention
are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict enormous, needless
losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second, overcoming artificial
barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan modifications with higher
rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is necessary to identify the right
policy solution.
Numerous theories have been advanced for the relatively low level of
modifications, including: restrictions on loan modifications in private-label
servicing agreements, threats of lawsuits by private-label investors, servicer
compensation arrangements, the high cost of loss mitigation, accounting rules,
junior liens, and tax considerations. This Article concludes that servicer
compensation coupled with the costly nature of loan workouts, accounting
standards, and junior liens form the biggest impediments to an efficient level of
loan modifications. These factors also tilt the mix of loan modifications toward
types of modifications with higher redefault rates. Other explanations, such as
servicing agreement restrictions, tax consequences, and the threat of lawsuits, are
either not at play or are of second order importance.
Connecticut Mutual Professor of Law and Director of the Insurance Law
Center at the University of Connecticut School of Law. The Author was the Assistant
Director for Mortgage Markets at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in 2011, where
she oversaw the Bureau's mortgage policy initiatives. The Author thanks the Pew
Charitable Trusts and the Joint Center on Housing Studies at Harvard University for their
generous support and for hosting her presentations of earlier versions of this work at
symposia.
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INTRODUCTION
Since housing prices fell nationwide in 2007, triggering the financial
crisis, the U.S. housing market has struggled to dispose of the huge ensuing
inventory of foreclosed homes. In January 2013, 1.47 million homes were listed
for sale.' Another 2.3 million homes that were not yet on the market-the so-
called "shadow inventory"-were in foreclosure, held as real estate owned or
encumbered by seriously delinquent loans. Discouragingly, the size of the shadow
inventory has not changed significantly since January 2009.2
Reducing the shadow inventory is key to stabilizing home prices. One
way to trim it is to accelerate the sale of foreclosed homes, thereby increasing the
outflow on the back-end. Another way is to prevent homes from entering the
shadow inventory to begin with, through loss mitigation methods designed to keep
struggling borrowers in their homes. Not all distressed borrowers can avoid losing
their homes, but in appropriate cases-where modifications can increase investors'
return compared to foreclosure and the borrowers can afford the new payments-
loan modifications can be a winning proposition for all.
This Article analyzes the progress of foreclosure prevention over the past
six years, with a focus on loan modifications. Since mid-2007, the federal
government has devoted enormous effort and sums of money to foreclosure
prevention. Washington's approach to rising foreclosures evolved over time. In the
first iteration, the government confined its efforts to convening private actors and
encouraging them to coordinate their loss mitigation efforts. In the second
iteration, starting with President Obama, the government augmented that approach
with subsidies for loan modifications. To a lesser degree, the Obama
administration also attempted to increase the cost of rushing to foreclosure to
servicers.
The results have been mixed. Under the George W. Bush administration,
two successive programs to refinance distressed loans into Federal Housing
Administration ("FHA") loans proved to be a failure. In December 2009, the
Obama administration's ambitious program to increase loan modifications
stumbled when the government revealed that most temporary modifications failed
to graduate into permanent modifications. While the graduation rate has since
improved, the level of permanent modifications remains well below what
policymakers had aimed for. This raises concerns about the existence of artificial
barriers to loan modifications in situations where foreclosure should and could be
avoided.
1. Calculations made by author based on national housing data reported in
February 2013. See Lexie Puckett, Spring Home Buying Season Off to Early Start,
REALTOR.COM (Mar. 14, 2013), http://www.realtor.com/blogs/2013/03/14/spring-home-
buying-season-starts-early/.
2. Press Release, CoreLogic, CoreLogic Reports Shadow Inventory Down 28
Percent From 2010 Peak, 1-2 fig.1 (Mar. 26, 2013), available at
http://www.corelogic.com/downloadable-docs/shadow-inventory-report-q4-2012.pdf.
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There are numerous theories as to what those barriers are. Some fault
restrictions on loan modifications in private-label servicing agreements, while
others point to threats of lawsuits by private-label investors. Servicer
compensation arrangements, the high cost of loss mitigation, accounting rules,
junior liens, and tax considerations have also been singled out for blame. This
Article evaluates those theories and determines that servicer compensation
together with the high cost of loan workouts, accounting standards, and junior liens
are the biggest impediments to efficient levels of loan modifications. These factors
also tilt the types of loan modifications that are made toward modifications with
higher redefault rates. Other explanations, such as servicing agreement restrictions,
tax consequences, and the threat of lawsuits, either are not at play or are of second-
order importance.
There are three pressing reasons to care about what the real barriers to
foreclosure prevention are. First, foreclosures that could have been avoided inflict
enormous, needless losses on borrowers, investors, and society at large. Second,
overcoming artificial barriers to foreclosure prevention will result in loan
modifications with higher rates of success. Finally, knowing what to fix is
necessary to identify the right policy solution.
Three basic reforms are needed to relieve the impediments to foreclosure
prevention. The first involves our broken system of mortgage servicing. That
system is the product of skewed compensation incentives, and reforming servicer
compensation needs to take top priority in policies to strengthen foreclosure
prevention. In the future, servicers need to be paid less for servicing performing
loans and more for doing loss mitigation whenever efficient.
The second reform addresses the obstacles that junior liens and
accounting considerations pose to constructive loss mitigation. These two
problems together drive home the need for regulators and accountants to require
banks to take prompt write-downs of distressed loans. Mark-to-market accounting
will help dismantle the incentives for banks to resist permanent loan modifications.
Write-offs of worthless junior liens will also remove the impediments to workouts
that many of those liens pose.
Finally, it is time to revise investor servicing agreements and guidelines
to institutionalize the lessons from servicing reforms that worked. In particular,
pooling and servicing agreements and servicing guidelines need to incorporate the
standardized waterfall approach of the Home Affordable Modification Program
("HAMP"), the importance of early intervention, and the importance of lowering
monthly payments, particularly through principal reduction. These changes will go
far to address the stark differences that currently exist among servicers in their
individual foreclosure prevention efforts. The anticipated reform of the nation's
housing finance system, moreover, presents a rare and historic opportunity to
implement these changes industry-wide.
Part I opens by exploring the rationales for foreclosure prevention. In Part
II, the Article chronicles the history of foreclosure prevention initiatives from 2007
to date. Part III describes the disappointing track record of those initiatives. In Part
IV, the Article turns to its main task, which is to analyze which of the competing
hypotheses actually explain the barriers to an optimal level of loan modifications.
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Part V closes by discussing the larger implications of this analysis for policy
reform.
I. RATIONALES FOR FORECLOSURE PREVENTION
During the financial crisis, policymakers advanced two main
justifications for foreclosure prevention: first, the economic self-interest of
investors, and second, minimizing the harmful spillover effects to society from
foreclosures .
Interestingly, redressing wrongs to injured borrowers was not a central
rationale for loss mitigation, mostly due to concerns that protracted legal
proceedings to resolve alleged wrongs to borrowers would have mired the loss
mitigation process in protracted delays. Backlash against borrowers who defaulted
on their loans also played a role.4
A. Potential Benefits to Investors and Other Holders
Most observers agree that under the right circumstances, investors can
reduce their losses on distressed home loans by agreeing to workouts instead of
proceeding to foreclosure. Loss severities on subprime residential foreclosures
average around 50% and can be even higher for loans with steep initial loan-to-
value ratios or declining property values. 6
3. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., THE U.S. HOUSING
MARKET: CURRENT CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 1-2 (2012) [hereinafter FED.
RESERVE, WHITE PAPER], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/other-
reports/files/housing-white-paper-20120104.pdf; John Kiff & Vladimir Klyuev, Foreclosure
Mitigation Efforts in the United States: Approaches and Challenges, INT'L MONETARY
FUND, 7-8, 14 (2009), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn
0902.pdf.
4. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke repeatedly took pains to counteract
that backlash, stressing that foreclosures injure neighborhoods and communities, regardless
of who is to blame. FED. RESERVE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 1-2; see also Kiff &
Klyuev, supra note 3, at 14.
5. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., Speech at the Federal Reserve System Conference on Housing and Mortgage Markets,
Washington, D.C.: Housing, Mortgage Markets, and Foreclosures (Dec. 4, 2008),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20081204a.htm.
6. See, e.g., id.; Dennis R. Capozza & Thomas A. Thomson, Subprime
Transitions: Lingering or Malingering in Default?, 33 J. REAL EST. FIN. EcON. 241, 241
(2006); Shaila Dewan, U.S. Agency to Sell Off Loans to Stem Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES,
June 9, 2012, at B4 (reporting FHA loss severities of 64%); Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan,
Andreas Lehnert, Nellie Liang & Eileen Mauskopf, Designing Loan Modifications to
Address the Mortgage Crisis and the Making Home Affordable Program 7 (Fed. Reserve
Bd., Fin, and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2009-43, 2009) [hereinafter
Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications], available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/p
ubs/feds/2009/200943/200943pap.pdf; Larry Cordell, Karen Dynan, Andreas Lehnert,
Nellie Liang & Eileen Mauskopf, The Incentives of Mortgage Servicers: Myths and
Realities 3, 11-12 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Fin, and Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No.
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This high loss severity results largely from the heavy deadweight costs
attending foreclosure. The biggest deadweight costs are missed mortgage
payments during the period leading up to foreclosure.7 In addition, the holder
incurs assorted transaction costs during the course of foreclosure, including realtor
commissions, legal fees, utilities, taxes, insurance, and maintenance. These costs
can consume 10% to 15% of the loan balance. Finally, foreclosed homes sell at a
27% discount on average compared to normal homes, due to the fire sale nature of
liquidation, poor maintenance by distressed borrowers, and vandalism to vacant
foreclosed homes.8
Loss mitigation can also improve investors' cash flow. Every time a
delinquent borrower seeks to become current by making a mortgage payment, that
payment boosts investors' net revenue. This effect is even more pronounced for
subprime loans to the extent that borrowers pay premium rates on those loans.9
This potential revenue effect, combined with the high loss severities on distressed
loans, creates room for investors and banks to cut their losses by agreeing to
workouts of troubled loans.
B. Avoiding Harmful Spillover Effects
In tandem with investor welfare, avoiding harmful spillover effects to
society from foreclosures is the other major reason for loss mitigation programs.
This objective gained urgency in 2007 as falling housing prices dragged down the
larger economy.
Starting in 2007, the national decline in home prices created a negative
feedback effect that triggered, and then exacerbated, the ensuing recession.' 0 As
housing prices dropped, more and more homeowners found themselves in a
negative equity position after the value of their homes fell below the balances on
their mortgages. During the housing boom, many of these households had taken
out loans with little or nothing down, including subprime or exotic adjustable-rate
mortgages ("ARMs")" with payments that were ultimately unmanageable. Once
their home equity evaporated, "underwater" borrowers who had difficulty making
payments discovered that they could not refinance or sell their homes for enough
2008-46, 2008) [hereinafter Cordell et al., Myths and Realities], available at http://www.fed
eralreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200846/200846pap.pdf.
7. Generally, servicers are contractually obliged to advance principal and
interest to the trust pending foreclosure. Once a foreclosure proceeds to sale, however,
servicers can recoup those advances from the sale proceeds. Cordell et al., Myths and
Realities, supra note 6, at 11.
8. John Y. Campbell, Stefano Giglio & Parag Pathak, Forced Sales and House
Prices, 101 Am. ECON. REv. 2108, 2110, 2117-2121 (2011); see also Bernanke, supra note
5; Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 11-13; Cordell et al., Designing Loan
Modifications, supra note 6, at 6-8.
9. Capozza & Thomson, supra note 6, at 243.
10. Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 4 5.
11. Most notably hybrid 2/28 or 3/27 ARMs, interest-only ARMs, and option
payment ARMs.
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money to retire their loans. The result was a sharp spike in residential mortgage
delinquencies and foreclosures.' 2
Mounting foreclosures further depressed housing prices. On the demand
side, foreclosures fueled tighter credit requirements as banks raised their
underwriting standards to avoid more delinquencies. 3 Losses from foreclosures
also eroded bank capital, constraining their capacity to lend. The resulting dearth
of credit stifled buyer demand for houses.14 By early 2012, U.S. housing prices had
fallen 33% since their 2006 high, wiping out about $7 trillion in household equity.
It was the nation's most severe housing price decline since the Great Depression. 5
Foreclosures also had supply side effects. As foreclosures flooded the
market, those homes sold at steep discounts, depressing home prices. Foreclosed
properties lower the values of nearby homes by anywhere from 1% to 9%.16 That,
in turn, can reduce property tax revenues on neighboring homes.17
Eventually, the severely depressed property values pulled down the larger
economy. As households became unable to tap their home equity to spend,
consumer purchases declined.'" Consumption fell and employers laid off workers,
12. See, e.g., Maureen Maitland, First and Second Mortgage Default Rates Fall
in February 2012, HOUSING VIEWS (March 20, 2012, 11:45 AM), available at
http://www.housingviews.com/2012/03/20/first-and-second-mortgage-default-rates-fall-
again-in-february-2012/. Negative equity also harmed job mobility. Some underwater
borrowers had to turn down job offers in other cities because they could not sell their homes
for enough to retire their mortgages. Fernando Ferreira, Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy,
Housing Busts and Household Mobility, 68 J. URB. ECON. 34, 43-44 (2010); Fernando
Ferreira, Joseph Gyourko & Joseph Tracy, Housing Busts and Household Mobility: An
Update (Fed. Res. Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 526, 2011), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr526.pdf (owners with negative equity
were 25% to 30% less likely to move than comparable homeowners with positive equity).
13. See, e.g., BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE SYs., THE APRIL 2009
SENIOR LOAN OFFICER OPINION SURVEY ON BANKING LENDING PRACTICES 1 (2009),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/snloansurvey/200905/fullreport.pdf.
14. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA, Housing May Have Finally
Turned Around in 2012, in 2012 ANNUAL REPORT (2013), available at
http://www.frbatlanta.org/pubs/annualreport/12ar/housing.cfm.
15. See FED. RESERVE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 3.
16. See, e.g., Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 5; Campbell et al., supra note 8, at
2111, 2124-29; John P. Harding, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent Yao, The Contagion Effect of
Foreclosed Properties, 66 J. URB. ECON. 164, 165 (2009); Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith,
The External Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on
Property Values, 17 HOUSING POLICY DEBATE 57, 69 (2006).
17. Vacant foreclosed homes also generate negative externalities in the form of
squatters, vandalism, and crime, sending neighborhoods into tailspins and requiring higher
municipal outlays for police and social services. Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 13;
Bemanke, supra note 5, at 3.
18. See MARTIN H. BAILY ET AL., MCKINSEY & CO., WLL US CONSUMER DEBT
REDUCTION CRIPPLE THE RECOVERY?, 3, 5-7 (2009), available at http://www.mckinsey.com
/insights/global capital markets/ableModificationProgram.pdf.
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causing household incomes to contract.19 Shrinking paychecks and falling house
prices forced more households-including growing numbers of prime borrowers-
to default on their mortgages after they could not make their loan payments and
could not sell their homes for the balance of their mortgages.20 By the end of 2009,
serious delinquencies had skyrocketed. In December 2009, 7.01% of all prime
mortgages were 90 days delinquent or more, compared to 3.74% in December
2008. Over that same period, the percentage of subprime mortgages that were 90
21days delinquent or more soared from 23.11% to 30.56%. Meanwhile, foreclosure
inventories rose to new highs, further depressing home prices. Beginning in early
2010, serious mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures slowed and continued to
decrease. However, the amount of foreclosure inventory remained high as of
January 2013.22 Almost one million homes in some stage of foreclosure were sold
during 2012, and 43% of all home sales that year were distressed sales. 2 3 Starting
in 2007, the devastating level of foreclosures after the burst of the housing bubble
exerted pressure on the federal government to increase foreclosure prevention
efforts.
II. FEDERAL FORECLOSURE PREVENTION POLICIES
Foreclosure prevention seeks to break the negative feedback loop
between falling property values and foreclosures by keeping borrowers in their
homes and restoring them to current status on their loans. Starting in 2007, the
federal government cycled through three basic models for achieving foreclosure
prevention. The first model consisted of convening market actors to coordinate and
facilitate foreclosure prevention by private industry. Second, the government
offered subsidies to induce foreclosure prevention. Third, the government took
specific actions to increase the costs to market participants of pursuing
unnecessary foreclosures.
For the most part, during the recent economic crisis, the federal
government pursued the first and second models, with sparing use of the third. At
any given point during the crisis, the model that was chosen depended on the
19. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 3.
20. See, e.g., id. at 5.
21. Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass'n, Delinquencies, Foreclosure Starts Fall
in Latest MBA National Delinquency Survey (Feb. 19, 2010),
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/newsandmedia/presscenter/71891.htm.
22. Press Release, CoreLogic, supra note 2, at 1 2 fig.1; see also LENDER
PROCESSING SERVICES, LPS MORTGAGE MONITOR: MAY 2013 MORTGAGE
PERFORMANCE OBSERVATIONS 18 (2013), http://www.lpsvcs.com/LPSCorporatelnformation
/CommunicationCenter/DataReports/MortgageMonitor/201305MortgageMonitor/Mortgage
MonitorMay20l3.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY,
THE OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE HOUSING MARKET AND HELP
AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS 3 (2013), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/documents/huddocid=
MayNat2013_Scd FINAL.pdf.
23. See, e.g., Non-Foreclosure Short Sales Increase 4 Percent, Account for 22
Percent of All Sales, REALTYTRAC.COM (Feb. 26, 2013), http://www.realtytrac.com/content/
foreclosure-market-report/us-foreclosure-and-short-sales-report-year-end-and-q4-2012-
7609.
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primary objective-refinancing or loan modification-and the administration that
was in power.
The federal government's policy on foreclosure prevention evolved with
the diagnosis of the underlying problem. Initially, policymakers were mainly
concerned about the payment shock from impending rate resets on hybrid ARMs,
interest-only ARMs, and option ARMs.2 After ARM indices such as the London
25Interbank Offered Rate ("LIBOR") plunged in the fall of 2008, however,
concerns about payment shock diminished and attention turned to rising
unemployment and its contribution to mounting delinquencies. Starting in late
2010, vigorous debate ensued over the role of negative equity in decisions to
default and the best way to address that problem.
A. Refinance Programs for Delinquent Borrowers
During the summer of 2007, the private-label market for residential
mortgage-backed securities ("RMBS") crashed, setting the stage for a tsunami of
foreclosures. Once private-label financing vanished, many financially stressed
borrowers were no longer able to refinance their loans. The paucity of refinance
options was especially severe for borrowers with delinquent or underwater loans.
With no way to escape impending rate resets on their ARMs or to reduce their
household expenses by selling their homes and paying off their mortgages,
millions of households were soon in default.
After private-label financing was no longer an option, the federal
government initially sought to stave off foreclosures by refinancing some
delinquent mortgages into FHA-insured loans. The first major refinance program
was FHASecure, which the George W. Bush administration launched in August
2007. Under FHASecure, borrowers who faced high payment shock from
imminent rate resets on subprime adjustable-rate loans were given the opportunity
to refinance into FHA-insured fixed-rate loans. Participation by servicers was
voluntary, but servicers shunned the program because, for borrowers to qualify, the
servicer had to take a write-down of 3% or 10%, depending on the circumstances.
Eventually, after only about 4,200 borrowers qualified for the loans, the federal
government shut down the program at the end of 2008.6
In October 2008, the Bush administration rolled out another refinance
program, called Home for Homeowners ("H4H"). H4H was designed to refinance
delinquent borrowers with underwater loans into FHA-insured mortgages. Again,
under H4H, servicers had to first write down the principal, this time to no more
24. Adjustable-rate mortgages pose the risk that the interest rate on the mortgage
could rise in tandem with the index tied to the loan. Such an interest-rate adjustment is
known as a "rate reset."
25. See, e.g., LIBOR Rates: Historical Charts, FEDPRIMERATE.COM,
http://www.fedprimerate.com/libor/libor-rates-history-chart-graph.htm (last visited July 23,
2013).
26. See Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 18; see
also Michael Corkery, Mortgage 'Cram-Downs' Loom as Foreclosures Mount, WALL ST.
J., Dec. 31, 2008, at Cl.
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than 96.5% (initially 90%) of appraised value. In addition, servicers had to pay a
3% upfront FHA insurance premium and waive prepayment penalties and late fees.
Borrowers were required to share any future property appreciation at resale with
the FHA. Like FHASecure, these terms were no more attractive to servicers than
going to foreclosure. The program was an abysmal failure: By May 2009, only one
borrower had been refinanced into an H4H loan.2 7
These refinance programs were the main time the Bush administration
offered subsidieS28 to promote foreclosure prevention. Nevertheless, both programs
had a dismal track record because they depended on cooperation by servicers on
unattractive terms. In both programs, the government tried to navigate competing
goals without success. For instance, the government imposed the write-down
requirements to avoid rewarding lenders for inflating the amounts of loans. But
with participation voluntary, servicers were unwilling to swallow large and certain
write-downs rather than gambling on foreclosure. 2 9 Similarly, the government
made servicers, not borrowers, pay the FHA insurance premium on the usually
correct assumption that distressed borrowers lacked that kind of cash. This hefty
premium, along with the mandatory waiver of prepayment penalties and late fees,
were an added reason why servicers shunned H4H refinancing.
The government had good reason to insist on these tough terms. Because
housing values were continuing to decline, refinancing underwater loans at the full
appraised value would have eventually saddled the government with unwanted
losses while rewarding lenders and investors for making inflated loans.
Nonetheless, nothing required servicers and investors to swallow the required
write-downs and they refused to do so.
Given the mortgage industry's resistance to reducing principal, any future
government refinancing program will confront hard choices. 3 0 For a voluntary
27. See Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 21-22; Cordell et al., Designing Loan
Modifications, supra note 6, at 18-19; Renae Merle, Face-Lift for Foreclosure Prevention,
WASH. POST, May 26, 2009, at A10. Congress subsequently amended the program in the
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act in May 2009 to provide HUD greater flexibility in
the program's design. HUD then modified the program to allow the holder of the loan to
share in any future housing price appreciation. See Cordell et al., Designing Loan
Modifications, supra note 6, at 19.
28. The federal government insures FHA loans, which operates as a subsidy to
lenders who make those loans. In addition, disbursements exceeded revenues in fiscal years
2009 through 2012 for the FHA program, amounting to a further subsidy. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR 2012
FINANCIAL STATUS, FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 8, 32 (2012); U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS REGARDING THE FINANCIAL STATUS
OF THE FHA MUTUAL MORTGAGE INSURANCE FUND 7 (2009); Jacob Goldstein, Hidden
Housing Subsidy May Soon Come Out of Hiding, NPR PLANET MONEY (Nov. 16, 2012,
10:52 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2012/11/16/165207561/hidden-housing-
subsidy-may-soon-come-out-of-hiding.
29. Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 19.
30. In March 2010, for example, the Obama administration announced a new set
of liberalized FHA refinance rules for borrowers with underwater loans. Press Release, U.S.
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program to work, the government would probably have to eliminate a principal
write-down requirement. Alternatively, the government could compel servicers to
sell loans to the government at a mandatory haircut and then refinance some or all
of those loans into new FHA loans. That type of compulsion has not found
support.
In 2009, the Federal Housing Finance Agency ("FHFA") unveiled a new
refinance program, called the Home Affordable Refinance Program ("HARP").
HARP targeted performing Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac borrowers who lacked
sufficient equity to qualify for a traditional refinance.
In 2011, FHFA liberalized the program to eliminate or reduce loan level
pricing adjustments that increased borrowers' closing costs.31 Under this new
version-known as HARP 2.0-the government-sponsored enterprises ("GSEs")
reduced the putback risk32 on certain HARP loans and eliminated the old loan-to-
value ceiling of 125% that had discouraged HARP refinances for fixed-rate loans.
With HARP 2.0, the take-up rate nearly doubled from fourth quarter 2011 to first
quarter 2012.33 As of November 2012, however, only 2.1 million mortgages had
been refinanced in total through HARP.3 4 This disappointing track record
prompted President Obama to call for further expansion of HARP to private-label
and jumbo borrowers in his State of the Union address in January 2013.35
The President's proposal-dubbed HARP 3.0-had yet to be enacted as
of June 1, 2013. Meanwhile, HARP 2.0's disappointing numbers reflect the fact
that HARP does not assist delinquent borrowers. In addition, underwater
borrowers who do not have Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac loans cannot avail
themselves of HARP-even if they are current-and usually lack other refinance
Dep't of the Treasury, Housing Program Enhancements Offer Additional Options for
Struggling Homeowners (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/tg614.aspx (last visited July 26, 2013).
31. See News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Federal Housing Finance
Agency, FHFA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Announce HARP Changes to Reach More
Borrowers (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/22722/HARP%20release%20102
411%20Final.pdf. Loan level pricing adjustments are added fees on specific loans to
compensate for the higher risk profiles posed by individual borrowers. Lower credit scores
and low down payments are some of the factors that can result in LLPAs. See Dan Green,
Explaining Loan-Level Pricing Adjustments, THE MORTGAGE REPORTS (Mar. 22,
2011), http://themortgagereports.com/2770/llpa-loan-level-pricing-adjustments.
32. "Putback risk" refers to the risk that a lender will have to buy back a loan it
sold to Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac due to violation of GSE guidelines. See, e.g., Ronald D.
Orol, 'Put-back' Relief at Center of HARP Mortgage Fix, MarketWatch (Nov. 14, 2011,
4:11 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/put-back-relief-at-center-of-harp-mortgage-
fix-2011-11-14.
33. Tara Siegel Bernard, Hope and Frustration in New U.S. Effort to Help
Homeowners, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 2012, at Bi.
34. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, supra
note 22, at 5.
35. See President Barack Obama, State of the Union Address (Jan. 27, 2013).
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options in the private market. For them, in the absence of new congressional
legislation, refinancing is generally not an option.
B. Loan Workouts
Federal programs encouraging loan workouts formed the other major
approach to foreclosure prevention during the crisis. Under the George W. Bush
administration, the federal government used moral suasion to try to prod servicers
to modify distressed loans, to little avail. In contrast, the Obama administration
offered subsidies to servicers to modify distressed loans.
During the early stages of the crisis, in 2007 and the first part of 2008,
public policy was mostly concerned with impending rate resets on ARMs. Starting
in December 2007, the American Securitization Forum responded by
recommending a framework for voluntarily freezing interest rates on securitized
subprime adjustable-rate mortgages.3 6 Few if any servicers, however, adopted that
framework.
As the crisis progressed, however, early payment defaults experienced a
spike, making it clear that increasing numbers of homeowners could not afford
their monthly mortgage payments even at the initial interest rates. Some of these
loans were infected with fraud or were sloppily underwritten from the start,37
especially reduced-documentation loans. The widening recession also took its toll.
Between May 2007 and November 2009, unemployment soared from 4.4% to
10%.38 Others who remained employed suffered lower wages due to reduced hours
or pay cuts. By 2009, lost income surpassed all other reasons for seeking loan
workouts, including rate resets and illness. 3 9 As this evidence amassed, it became
36. See AM. SECURITIZATION FORUM, STREAMLINED FORECLOSURE AND Loss
AVOIDANCE FRAMEWORK FOR SECURITIZED SUBPRIME ADJUSTABLE RATE MORTGAGE
LOANS: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 1-4 (2007), available at: http://www.american
securitization.com/uploadedFiles/ASFStreamlinedFrameworkQA121707.pdf.
37. See, e.g., Paul Carrillo, Fools or Crooks: Testing for Fraud in the Residential
Mortgage Market 2 (unpublished manuscript) (Dec. 2009), available at
http://business.gwu.edu/creua/research-papers/files/fools-or-crooks.pdf.
38. See Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey: Seasonal
Unemployment Rate, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/timeseries/LNS140
00000 (search from 2003 to 2013) (last visited July 30, 2013).
39. The Treasury Department reported that in 2009, lost income was the single
biggest reason why borrowers sought loan workouts under the Obama administration's
Making Home Affordable program. Roughly half of all borrowers who received permanent
loan modifications under that program did so due to loss of income. By January 2013, that
percentage had increased to 68%. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME
AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH JANUARY 2013 7 (2013)
[hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH
JAN. 2013], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Docu
ments/January%202013%20MHA%20Report%2OFinal.pdf.
2013] FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 735
increasingly clear that lower monthly payments were essential to successful loan
workouts.40
When loans become delinquent or in danger of default, servicers have a
variety of workout techniques to resolve those loans short of foreclosure. 4 1 This
large choice of options gives servicers discretion about which technique to use.
Like refinancing, some workout techniques allow the homeowner to
retain ownership of the home. Of those, some lower monthly payments, while
others do not. Capitalization takes the borrower's arrears and tacks them onto the
principal, thereby increasing the monthly payments, either immediately or later on.
When capitalization includes forbearance, the servicer temporarily lowers the
borrower's monthly payments but adds the forborne sums to the loan balance,
meaning that the loan payments will eventually become even higher. When
capitalization does not involve forbearance, the monthly payments immediately
rise. One way or the other, capitalization alone does not involve modification of
any loan terms.
Loan modifications, in contrast, alter the loan terms by extending the term
of the loan, reducing the interest rate, and/or lowering the principal. Many loan
modifications have the effect of lowering monthly payments.
Capitalization and modifications share the ostensible objective of keeping
homeowners in their homes. Other workout techniques result in liquidation and
normally require homeowners to vacate their homes. In a short sale, for example,
the servicer allows a borrower to sell the home for less than the outstanding loan
balance and often forgives the remaining amount due. In a deed in lieu of
foreclosure, the borrower deeds the house to the servicer and moves out in
exchange for full forgiveness of the debt. In some cases, however, the servicer may
lease the home back to the borrower, relieving any need to vacate the home.
The Bush administration rolled out an initial federal loan modification
program called HOPE Now in mid-2007. With President Obama's election, the
federal government altered its approach to loan modifications, and that approach
continues to evolve as of this writing.
40. See, e.g., Manuel Adelino, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Why Don't
Lenders Renegotiate More Home Mortgages? Redefaults, Self-Cures, and Securitization 3
(Fed. Res. Bank of Bos., Public Policy Discussion Papers No. 09-4, 2009), available at
http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/ppdp/2009/ppdp0904.pdf; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL,
MARCH OVERSIGHT REPORT: FORECLOSURE CRISIS WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION 49
(2009), available at http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/cop/20110402010739/http://cop.s
enate.gov/documents/cop-030609-report.pdf.
41. In this article, I use the term "loan workout" broadly to refer to the full
spectrum of techniques to resolve distressed loans short of refinancing or foreclosure.
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1. Bush Administration
a. HOPE NOW
The HOPE NOW Alliance, a private, voluntary program operated by the
mortgage industry, formed the heart of the Bush administration's foreclosure
prevention efforts. The industry launched the Alliance in mid-2007 at the urging of
the U.S. Departments of the Treasury and Housing and Urban Development.
HOPE NOW's purpose was to coordinate servicers, loan counselors, and the
securitization industry to identify distressed borrowers promptly, refer them to
mortgage counseling, and persuade servicers to grant proprietary modifications
where appropriate to their loans. Its original members included Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, credit counselors, eleven servicers covering about 60% of subprime
42loans, and other mortgage market participants. By officially embracing the
program, the Bush administration made HOPE NOW the focus of its repeated calls
for servicers to modify more loans.4 3
HOPE NOW was strictly voluntary in nature: Nothing required servicers
to participate in the program or modify loans that met its guidelines. In tandem
with the American Securitization Forum, HOPE NOW introduced the "Teaser
Freezer" plan, which envisioned a five-year extension of the initial rates on
subprime ARMs for certain distressed borrowers.44 However, these and other
HOPE NOW guidelines did not mandate use of any loan workout formula or
numerical loan payment targets,4 5 spawning wide variation in the relief granted
and the processing of borrower requests. Between July 2007 and December 2012,
the program reported completing almost 18.7 million loan workouts. However,
57% of those workouts (10.65 million) resulted in liquidation or deferred or
rescheduled borrowers' payments temporarily without permanently lowering those
payments. The remaining 43% (8 million) were loan modifications, many of which
lowered the interest rate, reduced the principal, or extended the maturity date of
the loan.4 6
42. In February 2013, HOPE NOW reported that 67% of the mortgage servicing
industry participated in the HOPE NOW program. Industry Extrapolations and Metrics
(February 2013), HOPE NOW 3 (2013), available at http://www.hopenow.com/industry-
data/2013-04-08-HopeNow.FullReport(February)v. 1.pdf.
43. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Secretary Paulson Remarks
Following Hope Now Meeting (Oct. 31, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/hp659.aspx; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Remarks by
Secretary Henry M. Paulson, Jr. on Current Housing and Mortgage Market Developments
Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/hp612.aspx.
44. See Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 18.
45. Mortgage Servicing Guidelines, HOPE NOW 3 5 (2008), available at
http://www.hopenow.com/press-release/files/Mortgage%20Servicing%20Guidelines.pdf.
46. Industry Extrapolations and Metrics (Dec. 2012), HOPE NOW 4 (2013),
available at http://www.hopenow.com/industry-data/2013-02-07-HOPENOW-Full-Report-
(December)v2.pdf.
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Furthermore, the 43% statistic masks the fact that the proportion of HOPE
NOW workouts consisting of loan modifications started at a somewhat higher
level and then declined. In December 2008, roughly half of all of HOPE NOW's
workouts were loan modifications. By December 2012, that percentage had fallen
to 35%.47 Meanwhile, the success rate of HOPE NOW modifications is unknown,
because the program does not report that statistic.
b. Streamlined Loan Modification Programs by the FDIC and the
GSEs
In 2007 and 2008, Sheila Bair, Chairman of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), took a different approach, calling for a uniform,
streamlined template for loan modifications that was better designed to process the
growing volume of distressed loans. The FDIC took the opportunity to put such a
plan into effect after it inherited the servicing of over 60,000 seriously delinquent
loans in 2008 as conservator of the failed mortgage lender IndyMac. 48 Unlike
HOPE NOW, the FDIC was able to mandate participation in its program using its
power as conservator.
Under the FDIC's "Mod in a Box" program, all borrowers who were 60
days or more delinquent on owner-occupied loans and had combined loan-to-value
ratios of more than 75% were considered for loan modifications. 4 9 The program's
objective was to maximize net present value relative to foreclosure while reducing
the borrower's front-end debt-to-income ("DTI") ratio to 38%. The program
sought to achieve this through a standardized "waterfall" of workout steps that was
designed to lower the borrower's loan payments. First, the program capitalized
arrears. Then, the program sought to get the DTI ratio below 38% by reducing the
interest rate. If that was not enough, the term was extended, and if more was
needed to meet the 38% target, the principal could be reduced through
forbearance.5 0 The servicer received $1,000 for each modified loan.
47. Compare Appendix - Mortgage Loss Mitigation Statistics: Industry
Extrapolations (Monthly for Dec 2008 to Nov 2009), HOPE NOW 6-7 (2009), available at
http://www.hopenow.com/industry-data/HOPE%20NOW%20National%20Data%20July07
%20to%20Nov09%20v2%20(2).pdf, with Industry Extrapolations and Metrics (Dec. 2012),
supra note 46.
48. Richard A. Brown, Chief Economist, Mortgages and the Future of Housing
Finance, The FDIC Loan Modification Program at IndyMac Federal Savings Bank 2-4
(Oct. 2010), http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/mortgage-future-house finance/ppt/
Brown.PDF (PowerPoint presentation). OneWest Federal Savings Bank, as IndyMac's
successor, eventually assumed the servicing of those loans. OneWest changed from "Mod in
a Box" to the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP) protocols after HAMP took
effect. FDIC OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: AUDIT OF ONE WEST
BANK'S LOAN MODIFICATION PROGRAM (2011), available at http://www.fdicoig.gov/
reports 11/1 1-004EV.pdf.
49. See Breck Robinson, An Overview of the Home Affordable Modification
Program, CONSUMER COMPLIANCE OUTLOOK (3d Qtr. 2009), http://www.philadelphiafed.or
g/bank-resources/publications/consumer-compliance-outlook/2009/third-quarter/q3_02.cfm.
50. Brown, supra note 48, at 2.
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Between August 20, 2008, and February 1, 2009, 9,901 or about 26% of
IndyMac's seriously delinquent loans were modified.5 ' As the program gained
experience, later cohorts of modified loans had markedly lower redefault rates
52
compared to those modified before April 2009.
In the latter part of 2008, the new Federal Housing Finance Agency
introduced a similar streamlined loan modification program with slightly different
triggers and targets for delinquent loans guaranteed by the two GSEs Fannie Mae
and Freddie Mac.5 3 Both streamlined loan programs had their limitations. The
FDIC's program suffered from narrow coverage. The GSEs' program applied to
more loans, but did not cover the private-label securitization market, which
contained the bulk of subprime loans. Commentators queried why the programs
were limited to serious delinquencies and did not take negative equity into
account. They also asked whether the DTI targets were realistic or took sufficient
account of the borrowers' other debts.5 4 Despite these issues, the two streamlined
programs would later form the template for the Obama administration's loan
modification initiatives.
2. Obama Administration
a. Bankruptcy Cram-down Legislation
By the time the Obama administration took office in January 2009,
foreclosure starts were mounting while permanent loan modifications were
lagging. 5 As one of its first actions, the new administration sought legislation to
increase the bargaining power of homeowners facing foreclosure. At the urging of
the new administration, in March 2009, the House of Representatives voted to
allow federal bankruptcy judges to reduce the outstanding principal on first-lien,
owner-occupied mortgages of bankrupt debtors. The banking industry lobbied
heavily against a bankruptcy cram-down, however, and the Senate defeated the
bill. 5 6 The failed bankruptcy cram-down campaign was the first major instance
51. Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 16-18.
52. Brown, supra note 48, at 5, 11.
53. Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 16-18; U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-10-634, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: FURTHER ACTIONS NEEDED TO FULLY
AND EQUITABLY IMPLEMENT FORECLOSURE MITIGATION PROGRAMS 18 (2010), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10634.pdf; Cordell et al, Designing Loan Modifications,
supra note 6, at 19; News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Foreclosure Prevention &
Refinance Report, Third Quarter 2009 2 (Jan. 8, 2010), available at
http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/15345/3Q2009ForeclosurePreventionRefinanceRptl08 10.pdf.
54. See, e.g., CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, supra note 40; Kiff & Klyuev, supra
note 3, at 19. The FDIC later lowered its DTI ceiling to 31%. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABLITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-634, supra note 53, at 18.
55. See, e.g., Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 19-
20; Industry Extrapolations and Metrics (Feb. 2013), supra note 42 (showing a decrease in
the ratio of permanent modifications to foreclosure starts).
56. Tara Siegel Bernard, Losing Homes in the Wait for a Rescue, N.Y. TIMES,
May 14, 2009, at Bi.
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where the federal government sought to increase the cost to servicers for
threatening foreclosure.
b. Home Affordable Modification Program ("HAMP")
Had the bankruptcy legislation passed, it would have given distressed
homeowners a potent stick 5 7 to bargain for more loan modifications. Servicers
might have agreed to more loan modifications in order to avoid a possible cram-
down in bankruptcy court. With the legislation's defeat, the Obama administration
turned to subsidies to achieve its goals. Its major innovation was revamping
federal loan modification policies in two respects: standardizing loan modification
protocols in order to bring loan modifications to scale and paying servicers to
modify more loans.
The result was the "Making Home Affordable" program, which the
Treasury Department unveiled in February 2009.5' The program's central plank
was the HAMP. HAMP sought to alter the financial incentives of servicers by
paying them to modify loans where the net present value of a HAMP modification
would exceed the net present value of going to foreclosure.
Initially, HAMP offered servicers $1,000 to modify a first mortgage that
was at least 60 days delinquent and $500 to modify a home loan at imminent risk
of default.5 9 In addition, the program rewarded servicers with up to an additional
$1,000 per year for the first three years following a modification if the borrower
did not redefault. 60 The federal government financed the subsidies with $36.9
billion in Troubled Asset Relief Program ("TARP") funds.61
HAMP built on the basic streamlined design of the FDIC's "Mod in a
Box" program, but with more generous parameters. To qualify for HAMP,
57. Some commentators argued that the stick was too potent, criticizing
bankruptcy cram-downs, among other things, for giving debtors a windfall if home prices
later rose and for straining the already over extended bankruptcy court system. See, e.g.,
Eric A. Posner & Luigi Zingales, A Loan Modification Approach to the Housing Crisis, 10
Am. L. & EcoN. REV. 575, 583-84 (2009).
58. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, President Obama, Treasury
Secretary Tim Geithner, and Housing and Urban Development Secretary Shaun Donovan
Unveil the Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/2009218954476942.aspx.
59. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Homeowner Affordability and
Stability Plan Fact Sheet (Feb. 18, 2009), http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Pages/20092181117388144.aspx.
60. Id.
61. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, supra note 53, at 6.
There were special incentives for modifying loans of borrowers who were current on their
loans but at imminent risk of default. For these modifications, mortgage holders received
$1,500 and servicers received $500. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, HOME AFFORDABLE
MODIFICATION PROGRAM GUIDELINES (2009), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Documents/modification-program guidelines.pdf; Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Updated Detailed Program Description
(Mar. 4, 2009), www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/housing-fact-sheet.pdf.
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borrowers had to be owner-occupants with first-lien loan balances no larger than
the conforming limits and have a housing debt-to-income ratio of over 31%.62
They also had to be in default (defined as 60 days late or more on their loans) or at
risk of imminent default.63 At the outset, HAMP sought to lower borrowers'
monthly payments to 31% of gross monthly income for five years using three
means: (1) by reducing interest rates to as low as 2%; (2) then by extending the
loan term to up to forty years; and (3) then, if necessary, by forbearing (or, at the
servicer's option, forgiving) part of the principal.64 Any forborne principal would
be due at the end of the loan term, but no interest would be charged on that
amount. 65 If the net present value of a HAMP modification exceeded that with no
modification-calculated using a standardized net present value formula-then
HAMP required a loan modification.66 Significantly, HAMP did not require
servicers to permanently reduce principal in order to hit the 31% target.67 Nor did
HAMP take high total debt-to-income ratios into account.68
Borrowers seeking HAMP loan modifications had to go through two
steps. Initially, qualifying borrowers received a trial modification. If they stayed
current on their trial modifications for three months and submitted full
documentation of qualifying incomes and financial hardship, then they qualified
for permanent loan modifications. 69
62. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61, at 2-3.
63. The Government Accountability Office found that servicers have widely
varying definitions of the term "risk of imminent default." As a result, a borrower may
qualify for HAMP with one servicer, but not another. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY
OFFICE, GAO-10-933T, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: CONTINUED ATTENTION
NEEDED TO ENSURE THE TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY OF ONGOING PROGRAMS,
STATEMENT OF RICHARD J. HILLMAN, MANAGING DiR. FIN. MARKETS & COMM. INV. 11-12
(2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d10933t.pdf; see also OFFICE OF THE
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM, SIGTARP-10-
005, FACTORS AFFECTING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION
PROGRAM 26 (2010), available at http://www.sigtarp.gov/Audit%20Reports/FactorsAffecti
ngImplementation of theHomeAffordableModificationProgram.pdf.
64. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61, at 6-8.
65. Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 22; Edmund L.
Andrews, U.S. Sets Big Incentives to Head Off Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at
Al; U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61, at 9; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, supra note 61.
66. See, e.g., Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 23.
HAMP modifications could also proceed for Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac loans where the
net present value of the modification was less than that of foreclosure, so long as the GSE
bought the loan out of the pool. Id.
67. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61, at 8.
68. See FITCH RATINGS, U.S. RMBS SERVICERS' Loss MITIGATION AND
MODIFICATION EFFORTS UPDATE 6 (2009), http://www.realestateeconomywatch.com/wp-
includes/upload-files/musr1020.pdf.
69. Andrews, supra note 65, at Al; U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61, at
4-5, 9, 10, 13; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 61.
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Participation in HAMP was widespread. All servicers who serviced loans
guaranteed by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac were automatically eligible to
participate in HAMP. A handful of servicers who received more than one bailout
under TARP had to participate in the program.7 0 Later, as part of the Helping
Families Save Their Homes Act in May 2009, Congress extended HAMP to FHA
loans. 7 1 As of June 2010, 109 servicers, servicing the vast majority of eligible
72
mortgages, had signed on to HAMP.
c. Other Foreclosure Prevention Programs
Many borrowers were not suited for loan modifications under HAMP
because they could not afford the reduced monthly payments even at the target
31% DTI ratio.7 3 This was a particular problem for the growing number of
borrowers who had lost their jobs.7 4 Similarly, it was questionable whether HAMP
contained significant incentives to discourage deeply underwater borrowers from
defaulting on their mortgages. For borrowers in either situation who were
otherwise eligible for HAMP, Making Home Affordable proposed a new program
called Home Affordable Foreclosure Alternatives ("HAFA"). HAFA offered
financial incentives to servicers to accept short sales and deeds in lieu of
foreclosure instead of going to foreclosure. As of February 2013, only 126,240
HAFA transactions had been completed, most of which were short sales.7 5
Meanwhile, many individual servicers continued to offer their own proprietary loss
70. Andrews, supra note 65, at Al; U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61, at
14; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 61.
71. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., HUD Secretary Donovan
Announces New FHA-Making Home Affordable Loan Modification Guidelines (July 30,
2009), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press-releases-media-advisories/20
09/HUDNo.09-137 (last visited Sept. 7, 2013).
72. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-933T, supra note 63, at 9-10.
73. See CHRISTOPHER L. FOOTE, JEFF FUHRER, ELEEN MAUSKOPF & PAUL
WILLEN, FED. RESERVE BANK OF Bos., A PROPOSAL TO HELP DISTRESSED HOMEOWNERS: A
GOVERNMENT PAYMENT-SHARING PLAN 3-4 (2009), http://www.bos.frb.org/
economic/ppb/2009/ppb09 1.pdf.
74. See Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 9-11.
75. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 61; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, supra note 61; Home Affordable Modification Program, HAMP Update: New
Program Offers Borrowers Foreclosure Alternatives (2009), https://www.hmpadmin.com/
portal/news/docs/2009/hampupdatell3009.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING
HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH FEBRUARY 2013, at 4
(2013) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY
2013], available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Docum
ents/February%202013%20MHA%20Report%2OFinal.pdf. A survey of the eight largest
servicers showed that only 6.2% of all homeowners rejected for HAMP trial modifications
were in the process of short sales or deed in lieu of foreclosure transactions as of July 2010.
U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM: SERVICER
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH AUGUST 2010 (2010) [hereinafter U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, MHA SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH AUGUST 2010], available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/AugustMHAPublic2010.pdf.
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mitigation programs, often under the HOPE NOW umbrella.7 6 The Federal
Housing Administration offered a separate loss mitigation program for borrowers
with FHA loans who do not qualify for HAMP.7 7
During the six-year period starting in 2007, the federal government's
response to the foreclosure crisis substantially evolved. Over time, Washington's
response shifted from coordinating a voluntary, unfunded system of foreclosure, to
prevention, and finally to sponsoring one that was still voluntary but heavily
subsidized. As the quid pro quo for subsidies, the government required servicers to
analyze loan modifications under a standardized waterfall that was designed to
lower monthly payments. Under the Obama administration, the federal
government also took enforcement action and negotiated the mortgage servicing
settlement to correct servicing abuses. 78 These efforts, taken together, resulted in
improvement but a mixed record of success.
III. THE PACE OF FORECLOSURE MITIGATION TO DATE
Throughout 2008, the pace of loan workouts and modifications remained
frustratingly slow. It was only when the Obama administration introduced HAMP
that those numbers began to improve.7 9
A. The Early Phase of the Crisis in 2007and 2008
During 2007 and 2008, when HOPE NOW was the leading modification
program, only a paltry percentage of mortgages at least 60 days past due received a
workout of any kind. A Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study of those loans
reported that only 3% experienced an interest rate reduction, a principal reduction,
and/or an extension of the loan term in the first 12 months following the first
serious delinquency. Only 8.5% received any workout at all (including a principal
increase, a short sale, or a deed in lieu of foreclosure).o
These are aggregate numbers, however, and over the course of that two-
year time span, the success rate improved. Servicers of nonconforming home
mortgages agreed to more loan workouts with each passing quarter in 2007 and
2008. In the fourth quarter of 2008, there were seven to eight times more loan
workouts than in the first quarter of 2007." Over the period from 2007 through
2008, the mix of workout techniques also changed. Workouts that reduced
monthly payments became more common and workouts that increased monthly
76. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-634, supra note 53, at 18.
77. U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV. & U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, THE
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION'S EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE HOUSING MARKET AND HELP
AMERICAN HOMEOWNERS, supra note 22, at 1; U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., Loss
MITIGATION, available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/hudprograms/loss-miti
gation (last viewed July 17, 2013).
78. See infra text accompanying notes 79-129.
79. See, e.g., Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 6,
18-20.
80. Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 13-18, 37 tbl.5.
81. Id. at 11-12,35 tbl.3.
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payments declined.8 2 Nevertheless, over this period, workouts that reduced
monthly payments often still resulted in higher principal balances because they
capitalized arrears. 83
Despite this encouraging trend, these numbers mask the fact that the bulk
of loan modifications in 2007 and 2008 actually increased borrowers' monthly
payments instead of reducing them. In two path-breaking studies that brought this
problem to light, law professor Alan White reported that over two-thirds of the
loan workouts studied increased both the borrowers' loan payments and principal
by adding in overdue interest and fees without taking other steps to reduce
monthly payments. The average principal increase was a whopping $10,800.84
The Federal Reserve Bank of Boston study confirmed White's findings.
By the end of 2008, plans increasing principal remained the most common type of
workout by far. Such capitalization plans accounted for 61.5% of all loan workouts
in the fourth quarter of 2008. Interest rate reductions came in second (26.7%) and
principal reductions remained rare (1.4%).5 Loans from earlier vintages were
82. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 68, at 10; see also Andrew Haughwout, Ebiere
Okah & Joseph Tracy, Second Chances: Subprime Mortgage Modification and Redefault
(Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report No. 417, 2010), available at
http://www.newyorkfed.org/research/staff reports/sr417.pdf; Roberto G. Quercia & Lei
Ding, Loan Modifications and Redefault Risk: An Examination of Short-Term Impacts, 11
CITYSCAPE 171, 180, 181 exhibit 3 (2009), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/perio
dicals/cityscpe/voll lnum3/ch8.pdf.
83. See, e.g., J.M. Collins & C.K. Reid, Who Receives a Mortgage
Modification? Race and Income Differentials in Loan Workouts 18 (Jan. 2011)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1743159 (average balance
of modified loans rose from $7,400 to $8,160); Haughwout et al., supra note 82, at 12;
Quercia & Ding, supra note 82, at 181.
84. Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of
2008 Voluntary Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REv. 1107, 1114 (2009);
Alan M. White, Rewriting Contracts, Wholesale: Data on Voluntary Mortgage
Modifications from 2007 and 2008 Remittance Reports, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509 (2009).
85. Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 11-12, 35 tbl.3. According to the authors, as
of 2009, Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC and Litton Loan Servicing, LP were the only
servicers who granted principal reductions in nontrivial amounts. Id. at 12 n. 17. Agarwal et
al. reported that of pre-HAMP loans serviced by the 10 largest depository institution
servicers from January 2008 through May 2009, only portfolio loans received principal
deferrals, not private-label securitized loans. Only 3% of portfolio modifications had
principal deferral and only 1% had principal write downs. Interest-rate reductions were
deeper for private-label securitized loans than for bank-held loans and modifications of GSE
and private-label securitized loans were more likely to capitalize interest arrears than
modifications for bank-held loans. Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David,
Souphala Chomsisengphet, & Douglas D. Evanoff, The Role of Securitization in Mortgage
Renegotiation 22-23 (Fisher Coll. of Bus., Working Paper No. 2011-03-002, 2011). See
also Collins & Reid, supra note 83, at 17 (interest rate modifications lowered interest rates
by 165 to 175 basis points); Laurie S. Goodman, Roger Ashworth, Brian Landy & Lidan
Yang, The Case for Principal Reductions, 17 J. STRUCTURED FINANCE 29, 34 (2011) (over
98% of all GSE and FHA loan modifications capitalized arrears); Joseph R. Mason,
Subprime Servicer Reporting Can Do More for Modification than Government Subsidies 32
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especially likely to receive temporary forbearance plans restricted to
capitalization.8 6 Many of those workout plans failed and later had to be redone.8 7
These findings had profound implications. The prevalence of
capitalization plans at the end of 2008 indicated that servicers were kicking the
proverbial can down the road by temporarily delaying foreclosures instead of
preventing them. Increasing monthly payments for cash-strapped borrowers was
usually a recipe for failure, given the long average stint of unemployment during
this recession coupled with negative equity." More was needed to induce servicers
to lower monthly payments.
B. The Evolution of HAMP
HAMP sought to alter servicers' fee calculus by handing them cash for
modifying loans with lower monthly payments. This worked well enough that
HAMP's advent heralded a big uptick in interest rate reductions. By the latter half
of 2009, for approved workouts, interest rate reductions surpassed capitalizations
that increased principal. In the third quarter of 2009, for example, 81.1% of
workouts by national banks and thrifts reduced interest rates.8 9 Fitch Ratings found
similar patterns for private-label securitized mortgages. 90 By August 2010, all
permanent HAMP modifications featured interest rate reductions. 91 As of February
2013, the median Tier 1 HAMP loan modification cut the monthly payment by
(Mar. 19, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-id=1361331; Quercia & Ding, supra note
82, at 181 (for Columbia Collateral File modified private-label loans in Q2 2008, 8.4%
received principal reductions, but only 3% received principal reductions of over 20%).
86. J. Michael Collins & Christopher E. Herbert, Abt Assoc., Loan
Modifications as a Response to the Foreclosure Crisis: An Examination of Subprime Loan
Outcomes in Maryland and Surrounding States 19 (Dec. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.preservehomeownership.org/uploaded-files/0000/0041/loanmodstudyO9.pdf
(comparing likelihood of foreclosure or loan modification for distressed private-label loans
in mid-Atlantic states in November 2008 and June 2009).
87. Laurie S. Goodman, Roger Ashworth, Brian Landy & Lidan Yang, Mortgage
Modification Activity-Recent Developments, 21 J. FIXED INCOME 55, 58 (2012).
88. In December 2012, for instance, the average unemployed worker took 38.1
weeks (slightly over 7 months) to find new work. News Release, Bureau of Labor
Statistics, The Employment Situation - December 2012, 26 tbl.A-12 (Jan. 4, 2013),
available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit 01042013.pdf.
89. Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 11-12, 35 tbl.3; OFFICE OF THE
COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF
TREASURY, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK
AND FEDERAL THRIFT MORTGAGE LOAN DATA, THIRD QUARTER 2009 23, 28 (2009)
[hereinafter OCC & OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, THIRD QUARTER 2009], available at
http://www.ots.treas.gov/_files/482114.pdf.
90. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 68, at 10.
91. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MHA SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT
THROUGH AUGUST 2010, supra note 75; but see OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS
REPORT, THIRD QUARTER 2009, supra note 89, at 25 (reporting much lower principal
reduction rates for HAMP modifications by national banks and federal thrifts).
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$546 or 38%.92 This record and HAMP's superior redefault rateS93 influenced
servicers to reduce payments in their proprietary loan modifications as well.
HAMP also produced growing numbers of trial loan modifications. From
HAMP's inception through the end of 2009, over 1.1 million borrowers were
offered trial loan modifications. But of the 900,000-some borrowers who accepted
those trial modification offers in calendar year 2009, only 66,465-less than 8%-
graduated into permanent modifications. Servicer performance was all over the lot:
CitiMortgage had modified 47% of its eligible seriously delinquent loans as of
December 31, 2009, while Wachovia had only modified 3%.94 This low rate of
permanent modifications caused Fitch Ratings to conclude, "[T]he conversion
from trial mod under HAMP to actual finalized modification status has been
disappointing."95
Reportedly, several issues stymied permanent modifications. Some
borrowers failed to complete their paperwork; other times, servicers lost their
files. 96 Other borrowers who did complete their paperwork turned out to be
ineligible for HAMP based on their verified income.97 There were reports that the
government also paid servicers to do trial modifications,98 leading some to ask
whether servicers had adequate financial incentives to carry through with
permanent modification plans. Some even accused servicers of deliberately
approving trial modifications, collecting incentive payments, and proceeding to
foreclosure to maximize their fees.99
In November 2009, the Obama administration turned up the heat, pressing
servicers to grant more permanent modifications. To raise the costs of not making
permanent modifications, the Treasury Department threatened to publicly name
and thereby shame servicers who dragged their feet and to subject them to
92. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY 2013,
supra note 75, at 6.
93. See infra Section III.C.
94. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM:
SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER 2009, 3-5 (2010), available at
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/news/latest/Documents/report.pdf; see also OCC
AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, THIRD QUARTER 2009, supra note 89, at 43-44
(among servicers that were national banks or thrifts, only 4.1% of seriously delinquent
borrowers and borrowers in foreclosure received new loan modifications).
95. FITCH RATINGS, supra note 68, at 2.
96. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-556T, TROUBLED ASSET
RELIEF PROGRAM: HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM CONTINUES TO FACE
IMPLEMENTATION CHALLENGES, STATEMENT OF GENE L. DODARO, ACTING U.S.
COMPTROLLER GENERAL, 8 (2010); Olga Pierce & Paul Kiel, By the Numbers: A Revealing
Look at the Mortgage Mod Meltdown, PROPUBLICA (Mar. 8, 2011, 12:37 PM),
http://www.propublica.org/article/by-the-numbers-a-revealing-look-at-the-mortgage-mod-
meltdown.
97. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-556T, supra note 96,
at 8.
98. See Peter S. Goodman, U.S. to Pressure Mortgage Firms for Loan Relief,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2009, at Al.
99. See id.
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sanctions including fines. Additionally, the government announced that it would
withhold incentive payments until modifications became permanent. The
following month, the number of permanent loan modifications more than
doubled. 00 In January 2010, the government streamlined borrowers'
documentation requirements, making it easier to convert temporary modifications
into permanent ones.101
These measures, taken together, helped increase the permanent
modification rate. Still, the federal government remained dissatisfied. In March
2010, it took more aggressive steps to boost permanent loan modifications. One
provision was designed to assist delinquent homeowners who had lost their jobs.
For the first time under HAMP, unemployed borrowers who qualified for HAMP
could have their mortgage payments cut to 31% of gross income for three to six
months while they looked for work.102
In March 2010, the administration also took its first steps to address the
growing problem of negative equity. In the Principal Reduction Alternative
("PRA"), the administration offered first-time incentives to servicers to approve
principal write-downs and to extinguish junior liens.103 Going forward, under PRA,
100. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE PROGRAM:
SERVICER PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER 2009, supra note 94, at 3; Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Obama Administration Kicks off Mortgage
Modification Conversion Drives (Nov. 30, 2009), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tg421.
101. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Administration Updates
Documentation Collection Process and Releases Guidance to Expedite Permanent
Modifications (Jan. 28, 2010), available at http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/
press releases media advisories/2010/HUDNo.10-021.
102. To qualify, the loan in question had to be for the borrower's owner-occupied
principal residence, have a mortgage balance of less than $729,750, and be originated
before 2009. In addition, the borrower had to prove financial hardship and have a monthly
mortgage payment exceeding 31% of his or her income. After six months, if the borrower
found work with lower pay or did not find work at all, he or she would respectively be
considered for a permanent HAMP modification or a short sale combined with relocation
assistance. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Making Home Affordable Program
Enhancements to Offer More Help for Homeowners 2 (Mar. 25, 2010),
http://www.makinghomeaffordable.gov/programs/Documents/HAMP%20ImprovementsF
act_%20Sheet_032510%20FINAL2.pdf. The results of the program, dubbed HAMP-UP,
were disappointing, with only 30,525 forbearance plans reported as of January 2013. This
low take-up rate is probably attributable, at least in part, to the fact that HAMP-UP provides
no subsidies to servicers. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, supra note 39, at 4. In another initiative
in February 2010, called the "Hardest Hit Fund," the administration expanded cash
assistance to states with the highest unemployment rates to funnel temporary grants to
unemployed homeowners to help them pay their mortgages. The administration expanded
that relief to unemployed borrowers in August 2010. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the
Treasury, Obama Administration Announces Additional Support for Targeted Foreclosure-
Prevention Programs to Help Homeowners Struggling with Unemployment (Aug.
11, 2010), http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/press/press-releases-media-advisorie
s/2010/HUDNo. 10-176.
103. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 102, at 2.
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for any underwater borrower owing more than 115% of the current value of his or
her home (except for borrowers with GSE loans), HAMP servicers had to calculate
the borrower's net present value using both the standard approach plus an
alternative approach containing incentives for writing down principal. If a
principal write-down was needed to reduce the borrower's monthly payment to
31% of income, the servicer could-but was not obliged to-reduce principal. To
induce principal write-downs, the federal government offered to pay 10 to 21 cents
for each dollar of unpaid principal written down (depending on the loan-to-value
ratio).104 In January 2012, the administration substantially hiked that subsidy from
18 to 63 cents and, for the first time, offered principal reduction incentives for
GSE loans. 05 By February 2013, only 8.2% of the permanent HAMP
modifications ever made featured principal reductions. Still, 70% of the HAMP
trial modifications of private-label and portfolio loans approved in February 2013
featured principal forgiveness. That rise in principal reduction modifications was
partly due to the mortgage servicing settlement and the government's decision to
triple the subsidies to investors.' 06
Another part of the March 2010 measures was designed to assist
relocation for delinquent borrowers who failed to qualify for loan modifications.
To encourage more short sales, the government increased subsidies to junior lien
holders to 6% of the outstanding loan balance to induce them to release their liens.
Additionally, incentive payments to servicers for short sales rose from $1,000 to
$1,500. The government also announced plans to double relocation payments to up
to $3,000 for borrowers who successfully completed short sales or deed-in-lieu
transactions.' 07
Other measures in the March 2010 initiative were meant to lower the
administrative barriers to HAMP modifications. In those provisions, the Treasury
Department prohibited HAMP servicers from pursuing foreclosure during loan
modification negotiations and trial modification periods. Servicers were also
104. If the servicer opted to reduce principal, it would initially treat the reduction
as forbearance. To encourage borrowers to remain current on their new, lower loan
payments, servicers would then forgive the forborne amount in three equal steps over three
years, so long as the homeowner remained current on the payments. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't
of the Treasury, supra note 102, at 3.
105. Tim Massad, Making Home Affordable, Expanding our Efforts to Help More
Homeowners and Strengthen Hard-Hit Communities, TREASURY NOTES BLOG (Jan. 27,
2012), http://www.treasury.gov/connect/blog/Pages/Expanding-our-efforts-to-help-more-
homeowners-and-strengthen-hard-hit-communities.aspx.
106. See U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY
2013, supra note 75, at 3-4.
107. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 102, at 3-4. Two years
later, the Federal Housing Finance Agency announced additional strategies to facilitate the
number of short sales, including a 60-day deadline for responding to short sale offers and
enhancements addressing borrower eligibility, documentation, appraisals, antifraud
safeguards, payments to junior lienholders, and mortgage insurance. Press Release, Fed.
Hous. Fin. Agency, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to Streamline Short Sales to Help
Borrowers and Communities (Apr. 17, 2012), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/23
887/Short Sales release_041712.pdf.
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required to start considering borrowers in bankruptcy for HAMP relief upon
request and HAMP was extended to homeowners with FHA loans. No foreclosure
sale could proceed without written certification that the borrower was ineligible for
HAMP. Finally, the government increased the incentive payments to servicers for
making permanent loan modifications. 0 8
The next major development in HAMP came in June 2011, when the
Treasury Department carried out its threats to sanction HAMP servicers for poor
performance. Earlier that year, the Treasury Department had evaluated the ten
largest HAMP servicers. Following the assessments, the Treasury Department
concluded that all ten servicers had deficiencies. Four of those servicers-Bank of
America, N.A., J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC, and
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.-were in need of substantial improvement, and the other
six servicers needed moderate improvement. The Treasury Department withheld
financial incentives from Bank of America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo
pending future improvements.1 09
There things stood until January 2012, when the administration made the
latest changes to HAMP. That month, the administration extended the deadline to
apply for HAMP modifications one more year, to year-end 2013; relaxed the DTI
test to take account of nonmortgage debt; and extended HAMP relief to certain
rental properties.110
C. Evaluating HAMP's Record of Success
Despite the Obama administration's reforms, criticisms persist that
HAMP (and its proprietary counterpart, HOPE NOW) produced disappointingly
low levels of loan modifications. Initially, the administration forecasted that three
to four million distressed homeowners would receive HAMP loan modifications
by the end of 2012.' As of year-end 2012, however, only 1,136,482 permanent
HAMP modifications had been granted.112 Meanwhile, the quarterly number of
108. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 102, at 1.
109. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Obama Administration
Releases May Housing Scorecard Featuring New Making Home Affordable Servicer
Assessments, Regional Spotlight on Phoenix Housing Data (June 9, 2011),
http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/tgl205.aspx; U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH APRIL
2011 7-16 (2011), available at http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/
results/MHA-Reports/Documents/April%202011%20MHA%20Report%20FINAL.PDF.
110. Massad, supra note 105. Later, in May 2013, the administration extended
HAMP's deadline to the end of 2015. See, e.g., Clea Benson, Treasury Extends HAMP
Mortgage-Modification Program Through 2015, BLOOMBERG (May 30, 2013),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-30/treasury-extends-hamp-mortgage-
modification-program-through-2015.htm.
111. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 59.
112. U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, PROGRAM
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER 2012 (2013), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/December%202
012%20MHA%20Report%20Final.pdf.
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loan modifications (both HAMP and proprietary) mostly slumped after 2010.113
Given that trend, it is not surprising that foreclosure starts outpaced permanent
modifications (HAMP and otherwise) every quarter in 2011 through the fourth
quarter of 2012, usually by a margin of two to one or more.114
Another way to measure the success of loan modifications is by
examining redefault rates. In a properly designed loan modification, the borrower
will be able to afford the new payments. But during the early days of the financial
crisis, the redefault rates on loan modifications were profoundly disheartening,
suggesting that the loan modifications issued initially were poorly designed. The
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC") and the Office of Thrift
Supervision reported that loans serviced by the largest depository institutions in
the first quarter of 2008 had a discouraging total 12-month, 60-plus day redefault
rate of 52.1%.115 As servicers gained experience with loan modifications, however,
the 12-month, 60-plus day redefault rate fell during each succeeding year of loan
modifications, down to 21.9% for modifications made in the fourth quarter of
2011.116
Subsequent research showed that the right workout technique
substantially lowered the risk of redefault. As discussed above, the bulk of loan
workouts during the early years of the crisis involved capitalizing arrears with no
offsetting payment reductions, which ended up increasing borrowers' monthly
mortgage payments." 7 For borrowers with cash-flow problems-especially
113. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC MORTGAGE
METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL SAVINGS ASSOCIATION
MORTGAGE LOAN DATA, FOURTH QUARTER 2012 22 (2013), available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/mortgage-
metrics-2012/mortgage-metrics-q4-2012.pdf [hereinafter OCC MORTGAGE METRICS
REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012]; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC
MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT: DISCLOSURE OF NATIONAL BANK AND FEDERAL SAVINGS
ASSOCIATION MORTGAGE LOAN DATA, SECOND QUARTER 2011 23, 25 (2011) [hereinafter
OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2011], available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/mortgage-
metrics-201 1/mortgage-metrics-q2-201 1.pdf. Proprietary modifications turned upwards
during the last half of 2012, probably due to the mortgage servicing settlement and related
developments. See OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note
113, at 22.
114. OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note 113,
at 22, 24 (comparing HAMP modifications and other modifications to newly initiated
foreclosures); OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2011, supra note 113,
at 23.
115. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE
METRICS REPORT, FIRST QUARTER 2009 (2009), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/publi
cations/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/mortgage-metrics-ql-2009/def-
rates-mod-lons-60days-2009-1-quarter.html (last viewed Aug. 1, 2013). This metric refers
to the number of loan modifications that became 60 days delinquent or more during the first
twelve months following the loan modification.
116. OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note 113,
at 34.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 80-87.
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problems that were indefinite or permanent in nature-those workouts were
doomed to fail.
In contrast, the evidence consistently shows that loan modifications that
lower monthly payments, either by reducing interest, reducing principal, or
extending the maturity date, substantially lower redefault rates." Workouts that
cut interest rates perform better than workouts that only capitalize arrears. Further,
the bigger the interest rate cut, the lower the redefault rate.119 Principal reductions
have the lowest redefault rate of all three techniques, probably because they reduce
the role of negative equity as an independent driver of default while also lowering
monthly payments.12 0
As these numbers came to light, a dramatic shift ensued toward interest
rate reductions and principal reductions. According to the OCC, the proportion of
loan modifications with interest rate reductions grew markedly following the
introduction of HAMP, reaching an 87% high before falling slightly in 2011 and
2012.121 Over that same period, principal reductions and principal deferrals also
grew quickly, although from very low levels. By the fourth quarter of 2012, the
OCC reported that 20.0% of loan modifications reduced principal and another
20.5% deferred it.122 That trend was especially pronounced in the private-label
118. OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note 113,
at 40-43; U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE, PROGRAM
PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH DECEMBER 2012, supra note 112, at 7; Goodman et al.,
supra note 85; Quercia & Ding, supra note 82 (for Columbia Collateral File private-label
securitized loans during the second quarter of 2008, lowering the monthly payment by 30%
to 40% reduced the 30+ day delinquency rate by 18%); loan Voicu, Vicki Been, Mary
Weselcouch & Andrew Tschirart, Performance of HAMP Versus Non-HAMP
Modifications-Evidence from New York City 27-28 (N.Y.U. L. & Econ.,
Working Paper 11-41, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabstract-i
d=1950430; Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 19 (implying that lowering payments cuts
redefault rates by as much as 30%); Agarwal et al., supra note 85 (for every 10% drop in
the monthly payment, the 60-plus day delinquency rate dropped 4.3 percentage points (11%
in relative terms), down from an average base rate of 49%); Haughwout et al., supra note 82
(for every 10% drop in the monthly payment, the 90-plus day delinquency rate dropped 8%
(4.5 basis points) from the average 12-month redefault rate of 56%); Brown, supra note 48.
119. Agarwal et al., supra note 85; Voicu et al., supra note 118, at 27.
120. Goodman et al., supra note 87, at 55; Goodman et al., supra note 85, at 32;
Quercia & Ding, supra note 82, at 188-90; Patrick Bajari, Chenghuan Sean Chu & Minjung
Park, An Empirical Model of Subprime Mortgage Default from 2000 to 2007 32-33 (Nat'l
Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14625, 2008); Haughwout et al., supra note
82, at 24-25; Voicu et al., supra note 118, at 35; see also FED. RESERVE WHITE PAPER,
supra note 3, at 20-21.
121. See OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note
113, at 26; OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY & OFFICE OF THRIFT
SUPERVISION, OCC AND OTS MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2010 23
(2011).
122. OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note 113,
at 25.
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space, where principal reductions and principal deferrals made up 81.2%-over
four-fifths-of all private-label loan modifications in fourth quarter 2012.123
While the spurt in principal relief is notable-and may temporarily grow
as the principal reduction provisions of the mortgage servicing settlement take
effect-the fact that interest rate reductions still outpace principal reductions by
more than two to one, despite their higher redefault rates,' suggests continued
resistance to principal modifications. Furthermore, the OCC reported, over 84% of
loan modifications made in fourth quarter 2012 involved capitalization of
arrears.125 That undercut the growth in principal reductions by increasing the
outstanding principal of the capitalized loans and thereby boosting the default risk
of underwater borrowers.12 6 Thus, servicers continue to resist principal reductions,
despite their superior redefault rates.
As this discussion suggests, HAMP had some successes. Its insistence on
standardization and lower monthly payments produced markedly lower redefault
rates. Furthermore, the redefault rate of HAMP permanent modifications is lower
than that of proprietary modifications,127 probably due to HAMP's emphasis on
mandatory payment reductions. That superior track record-and publicity about
that track record through studies and monthly government reports-likely
contributed to servicers' decisions to lower monthly payments in their own
proprietary loan modifications. Nevertheless, HAMP's take-up rate was
disappointing, as was its graduation rate from temporary to permanent
modifications. 128
In sum, at the outset of the crisis, the federal government's foreclosure
prevention efforts experienced a painfully slow start. Only later did those efforts
become more aggressive, particularly under the Obama administration.
The federal government's early lukewarm response was a serious
mistake. Research shows that early intervention with troubled borrowers
significantly cuts defaults and redefault rates.12 9 Aggressive loss mitigation from
the outset of the crisis might have slowed the spread of the nation's housing woes,
123. Id. at 28; see also Goodman et al., supra note 87, at 56-57. In contrast,
Agarwal, Amromin, Ben-David, Chomsisengphet, and Evanoff reported that from January
2008 to May 2009, no private-label loan modifications in the OCC Mortgage Metrics
dataset featured principal deferral or write downs, while only 3% and 1% of portfolio loan
modifications respectively did. See Agarwal et al., supra note 85, at 22.
124. See OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note
113, at 25.
125. Id.
126. See id.; Collins & Reid, supra note 83, at 3.
127. See OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note
113, at 39.
128. Through January 2013, 1,151,340 (58%) of all HAMP trial modifications
graduated to permanent modifications, while 42% did not. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA:
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE REPORT THROUGH JAN. 2013, supra note 39, at 3.
129. See, e.g., Brown, supra note 48, at 6; Laurie S. Goodman, Roger Ashworth,
Brian Landy, & Lidan Yang, Modification Success-What Have We Learned?, 21 J. FIXED
INCOME 57, 57 (2011); Quercia & Ding, supra note 82, at 189.
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which instead triggered the deepest recession since the Great Depression. By
stopping unnecessary foreclosures early on, home values would have stabilized
more quickly, helping to halt the negative feedback loop leading to the widespread
loss of jobs. Large-scale loss mitigation would have been easier before so many
people became unemployed.
IV. POSSIBLE OBSTACLES TO OPTIMAL LEVELS OF LOAN
MODIFICATIONS
Although HAMP increased the number of loan modifications (including
workouts with lower payments and higher success rates), the level of permanent
loan modifications remains disappointingly low and well below the federal
government's projections. There is reason to believe that servicers have refused at
times to make loan modifications even when those modifications would have
avoided losses relative to foreclosure. At least four multivariate regression studies
have concluded, for instance, that servicers are less likely to modify the private-
label mortgages that they administer than their own loans held in portfolio, other
things being equal.13 0 Servicers act as agents for loans they administer for other
investors, who are the principals. Because servicers are more reluctant to grant
modifications for investor-owned private-label loans, compared to loans that
servicers themselves own, principal-agent problems may be impeding higher
numbers of cost-effective modifications of private-label loans.
In addition, servicers exhibit large and unexplained variations in their
propensity to modify loans with similar features and payment histories.131 Because
some of those loans were modified while other, equivalent loans were not, this
130. Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala
Chomsisengphet & Douglas D. Evanoff, Market Based Loss Mitigation Practices for
Troubled Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis 16 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Chi.,
Working Paper No. 2011-03, 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfmabs
tract id=1690627; Agarwal et al., supra note 85, at 5, 17; Vicki Been, Mary Weselcouch,
loan Voicu & Scott Murff, Determinants of the Incidence of Loan Modifications 20
(N.Y.U. L. & Econ., Working Paper No. 11-37, 2011), available at http://papers.ssm.com/s
ol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1941915; Tomasz Piskorski, Amit Seru & Vikrant Vig,
Securitization and Distressed Loan Renegotiation: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage
Crisis 27 (Chi. Booth Sch. of Bus. Research, Working Paper No. 09-02, 2010), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1321646; accord, Christopher Mayer,
Housing, Subprime Mortgages, and Securitization: How Did We Go Wrong and What Can
We Learn so This Doesn't Happen Again? 19 (2010) (unpublished manuscript),
available athttp://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/cbl/mousingSubprime.pdf ("Overall,
the evidence seems to support the likelihood that servicers of securitized mortgages
foreclosed on properties at a much higher rate than portfolio lenders did."); OCC
MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note 113, at 23; but see
Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 6 (reporting no difference).
131. See, e.g., Agarwal et al., supra note 85; Been et al., supra note 130, at 22;
Collins & Herbert, supra note 86, at 11; Goodman et al., supra note 87, at 57-58. For
statistics on the modification activities of individual large servicers, see generally U.S.
DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY 2013, supra note 75, at 9-
10.
2013] FORECLOSURE PREVENTION 753
suggests that more loan modifications could have been made. Similarly, the
number of principal reductions remains artificially low in light of their superior
effectiveness in preventing redefaults. Finally, following the robo-signing scandal
in the fall of 2010 involving questionable practices by the largest mortgage
servicers that were designed to hasten foreclosures, federal banking regulators
sanctioned 14 of them for safety and soundness and consumer protection
132
violations. In the aftermath of that scandal, the largest servicers eventually
agreed to a massive mortgage servicing settlement in early 2012 with the federal
government and state attorneys general.133 This illegal rush to foreclosure by the
nation's biggest servicers indicates that some of those foreclosures could have
been avoided by properly designed loan modifications.
Taken together, these findings provide strong evidence that servicers
regularly turned down efficient loan modifications in favor of foreclosure even
though the modifications would have maximized recovery while keeping
borrowers in their homes. This evidence is just the beginning of the inquiry, not
the end. The question remains: What makes servicers so reluctant to grant cost-
effective loan modifications and how can this problem be addressed?
In this Section, I evaluate the explanations commonly given for the low
level of loan modifications. Initially, the slow pace of loan modifications partly
reflected the changing nature of the causes of default as the crisis deepened, plus
servicers' lack of experience with effective models of foreclosure prevention. But
other, more fundamental explanations have been advanced for the low rate as well.
These include manipulation of the net present value formula, the high cost of loss
mitigation, servicer compensation agreements, restrictions in pooling and servicing
agreements with private-label investors, moral hazard concerns, investor threats of
lawsuits, accounting considerations, junior liens, and tax treatment. Some of those
explanations focus on obstacles in the market for private-label residential
mortgage-backed securities, given rigidities in that market and its high level of
delinquent loans.134 Other reasons, such as accounting and tax rules, apply to the
servicing industry across the board. As it turns out, some of those hypotheses are
more valid than others.
A. Manipulation of the Net Present Value Analysis
A common barrier to loan modification relief involves the servicer's
analysis of the cost effectiveness of a loan modification. Most servicers, before
132. FED. RESERVE SYS., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY &
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF FORECLOSURE POLICIES AND
PRACTICES 3 (2011), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/news-
releases/201 1/nr-occ-2011-47a.pdf.
133. See, e.g., Overview of Mortgage Servicing Settlement, DEP'T OF Hous. &
URBAN DEV., http://portal.hud.gov/hudportal/HUD?src=/mortgageservicingsettlement (last
visited Aug. 3, 2013).
134. In 2008, for instance, private-label securitized subprime, Alt-A, and jumbo
prime loans accounted for more than half of foreclosure starts, even though they comprised
only 15% of all outstanding mortgages. Christopher Mayer, Edward Morrison & Tomasz
Piskorski, A New Proposalfor Loan Modification, 26 YALE J. ON REG. 417, 417-18 (2009).
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they agree to modify a loan, first determine whether a modification will increase
the net present value ("NPV") of the loan relative to foreclosure. Pooling and
servicing agreements ("PSAs")13 5 normally impose this NPV test for private-label
loans and require servicers to maximize the recovery for the benefit of the
investors in the trust as a whole. Servicers are to implement this requirement by
choosing the higher NPV, as between a loan workout and foreclosure. HAMP and
the GSEs also impose an NPV test, and many servicers similarly apply their own
NPV test to distressed loans held in portfolio.
Although the NPV requirement sounds formulaic, PSAs give servicers of
private-label residential mortgage-backed securities a high degree of latitude in
how to calculate it. This discretion allows the servicer to select the values for the
likely sales price from a foreclosure, the discount rate to apply to the reduced
revenue stream from a loan modification, and the likelihood that the borrower will
redefault. Investors rarely monitor these choices or question them.13 6 As a result,
for many distressed private-label loans, servicers can produce an NPV calculation
to support either a loan modification or foreclosure. This same dynamic, to a lesser
extent, affects the NPV test for HAMP modifications and for GSE loans.
There are three key factors in servicers' NPV determinations.1 3 7 First,
some distressed loans self-cure. Second, servicers are concerned about the risk that
a modified loan may redefault. Third, the higher the discount rate-in other words,
the more eager servicers are for cash today-the higher the likelihood of loan
modifications.138 These last two factors are within servicers' control to some
extent.
The cure rate is the rate at which seriously delinquent borrowers
independently resume payments. This rate has a direct effect on NPV calculations.
Cure rates can retard loan workouts by giving servicers hope that borrowers will
repay with no further intervention, either by making up their arrears or paying off
their loans in full.13 9 In many instances of cure, the servicer's recovery is higher
from doing nothing than it would be from granting a loan modification with a
lower monthly payment.
135. PSAs are the agreements between private-label investors and the servicers
who work for them that define, among other things, a servicer's responsibilities with respect
to loan modifications. See id. at 423.
136. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 18; Diane E. Thompson,
Why Servicers Foreclose When They Should Modify and Other Puzzles of Servicer
Behavior: Servicer Compensation and its Consequences 6 9 (Nat'l Consumer Law Ctr. Inc.,
Oct. 1, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502744; see also Kiff & Klyuev, supra
note 3, at 8 n.10 (discussing market forces affecting choice of discount rates). For GSE loan
pools, this discretion is more limited. Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac require servicers to use
standardized software to calculate NPV. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at
18.
137. See Cordell et al., Designing Loan Modifications, supra note 6, at 9-11, 23,
25 28; Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 17-19.
138. See Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 7.
139. See, e.g., id.
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Up through 2006, the cure rates on distressed mortgages were substantial.
From 2000 through 2006, prime loans had an average cure rate of 45%; for
subprime loans, the average cure rate was 19.4%. During the financial crisis,
however, cure rates plunged. By 2009, cure rates had plummeted to 6.6% for
prime loans and 5.3% for subprime loans.14 0 The tight market for refinance loans
and the rising tide of underwater mortgages helped explain this decline. As of
January 2013, the percentage of loans curing from foreclosure was less than 1%.141
The sharp fall in cure rates may be another reason why servicers became more
receptive over time to modifications and other types of workouts.
In contrast, redefault rates probably had the opposite effect. The
likelihood that a borrower will redefault on a loan following a workout will
directly affect the NPV calculus. Servicers have discretion over the type of loan
modification offered, and that choice will significantly affect the anticipated
redefault rate. As the chance of redefault increases, servicers will prefer to
foreclose as soon as possible instead of delaying the inevitable. Rapid foreclosure
also has the effect of accelerating the servicer's final payout. Furthermore, when
housing prices are falling, any delay in an inevitable foreclosure would depress the
ultimate sales price at the sheriff's sale. These dynamics can work to discourage
loan workouts.14 2
Finally, servicers of private-label securitized mortgages had broad
discretion in choosing the discount rate. Where a servicer is desperate for cash, it
may choose a more aggressive discount rate in order to rush to foreclosure.
In short, NPV calculations are subject to manipulation and servicers can
tilt them in favor of foreclosure. The NPV test has the additional drawback of
focusing solely on the benefit to the investor. This approach does not take into
account the social benefit from avoiding high spillover costs of foreclosures on
communities, the housing market, and the economy at large. 143 Consequently, to
the extent that the NPV test is malleable or that results under the NPV test diverge
from the larger society's welfare, there may be fewer loan modifications than
socially optimal. These problems with the NPV reflect larger problems with the
cost structure and compensation of servicers.
B. Agency Problems and Servicer Compensation in Private-Label Loans
As the problems with the NPV test suggest, whenever servicers
administer loans held by investors instead of their own loans held in portfolio,
there is potential for a classic agency problem vis-h-vis the investors who own
those loans.144 In the case of private-label securitized loans, this agency problem
140. Press Release, Fitch Ratings, Delinquency Cure Rates Worsening for U.S.
Prime RMBS (Aug. 24, 2009), http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/press-releases/detail.
cfm?prid=504898; see also Brown, supra note 48, at 11.
141. Press Release, CoreLogic, supra note 2, at 2 fig.4.
142. See Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 21-22.
143. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 20.
144. See Michael Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm:
Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FtNAN. EcoN. 305, 312-
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stems partly from the fact that the owners of private-label RMBS are diffuse,
making it hard for them to monitor servicers who have the day-to-day decision-
making responsibility for how to collect delinquent loans.14 5 An agency problem
can materialize when servicers reject modifications that would improve the net
present value of loans relative to foreclosure.
Exacerbating this agency conflict, pooling and servicing agreements
between investors and servicers for private-label loans were designed to reward
servicers for administering performing loans, not for handling large quantities of
delinquent loans in need of workouts. One of HAMP's main assumptions was that
securitization compensation structures make servicers more likely to resist loan
modifications. HAMP sought to correct this incentive structure and the resulting
agency problem by subsidizing servicers to approve more loan modifications.
HAMP's diagnosis is at least partially correct, even if its solution falls
short. In private-label RMBS, servicers have four main sources of revenue: fixed
servicing fees, float, default fees, and income from residual interests in the loan
pool. This compensation structure has numerous moving parts and creates
disparate incentives. Generally, however, the private-label compensation structure
tilts private-label RMBS servicers away from making principal and interest
reductions toward foreclosures and capitalization of arrears.
1. Fixed Servicing Fees
The single largest component of servicer compensation paid by investors
is the fixed monthly servicing fee. The GSEs pay a similar fixed servicing fee for
loans serviced on their behalf.14 6 In the case of RMBS, the fixed fee is computed as
a percentage of the outstanding principal balance of the loan pool. Typically,
annual fees are 25 basis points ("bps") for prime fixed-rate loans, 37.5 bps for
prime ARMs, and 50 bps or more for subprime loans. The servicer takes this fee
off the top of borrowers' monthly payments before remitting the principal and
income to the trustee to pass on to investors.14 7
Sometimes, the fixed-fee structure cuts in favor of a workout. A workout
that keeps a loan on the books allows the servicer to continue to collect the
servicing fee on the loan. Furthermore, the fixed-fee structure favors workouts that
raise monthly payments instead of lowering them. Capitalizing arrears and default
fees are more attractive because they pump up the unpaid balance of the loan pool
14 (1976); cf Yingjin Hila Gan & Christopher Mayer, Agency Conflicts, Asset Substitution,
and Securitization (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 12359, 2006)
(documenting agency conflicts in commercial mortgage-backed securities).
145. ADAM B. ASHCRAFT & TIL SCHUERMANN, UNDERSTANDING THE
SECURITIZATION OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CREDIT 16-18 (now publishers Inc. 2008); Mayer,
supra note 130, at 16-17.
146. See News Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, FHFA Announces Joint
Initiative to Consider Alternatives for a New Mortgage Servicing Compensation Structure
(Jan. 18, 2011), available at http://www.fhfa.gov/webfiles/19716/Servicing-modell 1811.
pdf.
147. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 15.
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and thus increase the servicing fee. Principal write-downs are less appealing to
servicers because they lower the unpaid balance of the loan pool.148
In other respects, the fixed-fee structure militates against workouts in
favor of foreclosure. In private-label securitizations, investors do not pay servicers
anything extra for completing loan workouts. Instead, servicers must pay the high
cost of overhead and labor for loss mitigation out of their fixed monthly servicing
fees. The higher those costs, the more reluctant servicers will be to pursue loss
mitigation over foreclosure.14 9
HAMP seeks to reverse this incentive structure by paying servicers for
every completed loan modification. Similarly, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac pay
servicers bonuses for executing workouts.15 0 Lingering questions about the
effectiveness of these steps, however, prompted the GSEs' regulator, the Federal
Housing Finance Agency, to begin overhauling GSE servicer compensation in
early 2011.151
Bottom-line, the fixed-fee structure can promote workouts, but those of a
certain kind. The structure makes servicers averse to principal write-downs.
Conversely, it causes servicers to favor capitalizations, while making them
indifferent to interest rate reductions.
2. Float
Servicers also collect "float," which consists of the interest earned on
mortgage payments held in escrow. Servicers collect this interest between the date
when borrowers send in their payments at the beginning of the month and the 2 5th
of the month, when the payments are usually passed through to investors.152 There
is no evidence that float has any significant effect on incentives to do loan
modifications.
3. Default Fees
Servicers charge borrowers default fees, including late fees and default
management fees, for late loan payments. Under the PSAs for securitized trusts,
servicers can keep all or part of these default fees and collect them out of the
proceeds from foreclosure.
The ability to assess default fees creates incentives favoring foreclosure
and capitalizing arrears. Default fees are highly lucrative and servicers want to
collect them as soon as possible. In a loan workout, servicers often condition an
agreement on immediate upfront payment of those fees or capitalize those fees as
arrears, either of which will increase the borrower's payments without some other
148. Thompson, supra note 136, at vi, 19-20.
149. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 23.
150. Id. at 17, 20-22.
151. Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, supra note 146.
152. Bill McBride, Tanta: Mortgage Servicing for UberNerds, CALCULATED RISK,
Feb. 20, 2007, 12:26 PM, http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2007/02/tanta-mortgage-
servicing-for-ubernerds.html.
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form of payment reduction. But at some point a workout will become impractical
if default fees continue to mount. At that point, servicers will generally initiate
foreclosure in order to collect the default fees.15 3 The rush to collect default fees
also encourages the common practice of "dual tracking," in which servicers who
are considering loan modification applications simultaneously proceed with
foreclosure.
4. Income from Residual Interests
Some servicers of private-label RMBS own the residual tranche of the
loan pool, also known as the "B piece."154 Usually, the B piece only pays excess
interest. In other words, the B piece only pays out if the interest payments by the
borrowers exceed the monthly interest payments due to the senior tranche holders.
As the junior tranche, the B piece holds the first-loss position, which means that it
stands first in line to absorb any losses from a delinquent loan.
Servicers who hold the B piece may favor loan workouts over
foreclosure to avoid losses to the residual tranche. At the same time, they are likely
to resist interest rate reductions that would eat into their excess interest
payments. 5 5
To summarize, most aspects of private-label servicer compensation cause
servicers to favor foreclosure over loss mitigation, even when loss mitigation
would increase the return to investors. To the extent that servicers do loan
modifications, the fixed monthly servicing fee helps explain why servicers prefer
interest rate reductions to principal reductions and capitalization of arrears most of
all. Furthermore, servicers who own the B piece may resist interest rate reductions
as well.
C. The Cost Structure of Loss Mitigation
The high cost of loss mitigation also helps explain the low level of
permanent loan modifications. Loss mitigation is significantly more expensive
than servicing performing loans. While this is true for all mortgages, it is most
pronounced in the private-label context, where servicers' standard compensation
arrangements with investors do not pay additional compensation for the higher
costs of loss mitigation. This makes foreclosure more attractive in relative terms.
153. Id.; Thompson, supra note 136, at 17. This component of compensation is
also subject to abuse. Disreputable servicers have incentives to manufacture late fees by not
posting on-time payments until after the due date or delaying initiating collection until late
fees can be assessed. Servicers may also take the opportunity to assess junk fees at
exorbitant rates for out-of-pocket expenses that are nonexistent or trivial in amount.
Thompson, supra note 136, at 17.
154. Thompson, supra note 136, at 4. A tranche is "one of a number of related
classes of securities offered as part of the same transaction." Id. at 6. For a description of the
role that tranches place in the payout and loss allocation structure of private-label RMBS,
see Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, Turning a Blind Eye: Wall Street Finance of
Predatory Lending, 75 FoRDHAm L. REv. 2039, 2045-48 (2007).
155. Thompson, supra note 136, at 3-4, 7-8, 20.
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Similarly, servicers' contractual obligation to advance interest and sometimes
principal payments on delinquent loans to private-label investors predisposes those
servicers toward foreclosure.
1. Expenses Associated with Loss Mitigation
From a servicer's perspective, loss mitigation is costly compared with
foreclosure. Workouts require dealing one-on-one with individual borrowers, each
with unique circumstances. Furthermore, for a loan modification to be successful,
loss mitigation needs to re-underwrite the borrower's income and assets and order
a property appraisal. This involves the same expertise as origination and requires a
different and costlier skill set than processing payments and collecting loans.15 6
Servicers who undertake loss mitigation often incur many of the costs
associated with foreclosure because they typically pursue foreclosure
simultaneously while loss mitigation is underway. Credit rating agencies
encouraged this practice of dual tracking by conditioning servicers' ratings on
prompt foreclosure of distressed loans.15 7 The March 2010 revisions to HAMP
grappled with this issue by prohibiting foreclosure proceedings against HAMP-
eligible borrowers during loan modification negotiations. 5 More generally, rules
adopted by the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau in January 2013 prohibit
servicers from initiating foreclosure if a borrower files a timely application for a
loan modification or other type of workout.15 9
The monthly servicing fee structure of pooling and servicing agreements
between servicers and private-label investors does not reward servicers for the
higher costs associated with loss mitigation. That is because the servicing fee
remains fixed even when overhead and labor costs start to rise. Further, under
PSAs, servicers cannot recoup overhead or labor costs at payoff or at
foreclosure.' 60 Consequently, absent subsidies or penalties, servicers have little
incentive to incur added overhead or labor costs. Servicers thus favor foreclosure
because of the substantially higher cost of workouts.
In view of this cost structure, it is not surprising that the top servicers did
not properly staff their loss mitigation operations and instead cut corners in order
to speed foreclosure proceedings along. These problems became so severe that
federal banking regulators sanctioned some of the nation's largest servicers in
2011 for safety and soundness as well as consumer protection violations and later
156. See, e.g., Goodman et al., supra note 85, at 31-32.
157. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 15; Thompson, supra
note 136, at 15.
158. Fact Sheet, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, supra note 102, at 1.
159. See Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013).
160. At payoff or foreclosure, a servicer can recover all principal and interest
payments advanced, as well as out-of-pocket costs such as legal fees, title searches, and
appraisals that are associated with foreclosure or loan workouts. In contrast, PSAs do not
pay servicers for overhead and labor, except out of the fixed monthly servicing fee. Kiff &
Klyuev, supra note 3, at 11.
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negotiated the mortgage servicing settlement with many of those servicers in
tandem with the states.'61
As a result of this underinvestment in loss mitigation activities, most
servicers lacked the staff or expertise to handle the flood of loan workout requests
during the mortgage crisis. Borrowers and housing counselors reported chronic
difficulties in getting servicers to answer phone calls and servicers often lost
documents submitted by borrowers.162 Servicers dragged their feet in automating
their systems to streamline loan modifications.' 63 In sum, the fixed-fee structure of
servicers, combined with the high cost of loss mitigation, resulted in a business
model that was sorely unprepared to accommodate the unprecedented spike in
delinquent loans and workout requests.
HAMP made headway into this compensation and cost structure problem
by standardizing modification procedures and paying servicers bonuses for
approving permanent loan modifications. Judging from the unexpectedly low
number of permanent HAMP modifications to date, though, HAMP subsidies
alone were not enough to alleviate the problem.
2. The Cost ofAdvancing Payments
In private-label securitizations, advancing delinquent payments and
financing those advances are another factor in servicers' cost calculus. Under the
typical private-label PSA, servicers must advance interest payments (and
sometimes principal) for delinquent loans to investors for the time period specified
in the PSA. Some PSAs require advances until a loan becomes 90 days delinquent;
others require advances until the home is liquidated after foreclosure. ' In addition
to making advances, servicers must pay property taxes and insurance on all
delinquent loans until the loans are paid off or the properties are sold.
The advance payment requirement often encourages servicers to pursue
foreclosure because servicers can recoup all advance payments from the sales
proceeds of foreclosure quickly. While servicers can also recover their advances in
loan modifications, unlike foreclosure, the speed of recovery in loan modifications
is uncertain and often slow. To the extent that servicers agree to loan
modifications, they are likely to condition those modifications on quick repayment
of all advances.165 That may boost the borrower's monthly payments, at least
temporarily.
161. FED. RESERVE SYS., OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY &
OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, supra note 132, at 3, 8; see also FED. RESERVE, WHITE
PAPER, supra note 3, at 22 23.
162. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 9.
163. Id. at 23.
164. The GSEs have similar advance requirements. Historically, for GSE loans,
servicers only had to make advances through the fourth month of delinquency, after which
the GSEs purchased the loans out of the pool. At the end of 2007, however, Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac both curtailed such purchases. See id. at 16.
165. McBride, supra note 152; Thompson, supra note 136, at 23-26.
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The advance payment requirement entails another major cost
consideration. Servicers must finance the advances that they pay, and this debt
service can be substantial. Moreover, servicers cannot recover the cost of financing
those advances from the proceeds of foreclosure, unlike the advances themselves.
Consequently, servicers have an interest in terminating advance payments as
quickly as possible. In states where the foreclosure process is fast (generally
nonjudicial foreclosure states), this will augur in favor of foreclosure.' 66 In states
where foreclosure proceedings are slow (judicial foreclosure states), servicers are
more likely to pursue quick workouts to restore the loan to current status and stop
making advances.167 Unless those workouts reduce the borrowers' monthly
payments, however, they are not likely to succeed in the long run.168
D. Contractual Limitations in PSAs for Private-Label Securitizations
In addition to hurdles posed by revenue and cost considerations, there has
been much debate over the role of PSAs in limiting servicers' discretion to modify
loans.169 For nonconforming loans that are securitized, the servicer's ability to
negotiate a workout is subject to the constraints in the PSA for the loan pool.
However, the vast majority of PSAs permit material loan modifications to some
degree in the event of default, imminent default, or reasonably foreseeable
default.170
Most PSAs give servicers broad discretion to negotiate forbearance that
temporarily extends delinquent payments but does not require a change of loan
terms, so long as the servicer timely forwards the missed payments to investors. 171
While PSAs are usually stricter about permanent loan modifications, they vary
widely from deal to deal.172 A small percentage of PSAs-roughly 10%-prohibit
166. See Thompson, supra note 136, at 26.
167. See id.
168. Id. Piskorski et al. found that servicers of delinquent securitized loans
proceeded to foreclosure more often in states with fast foreclosure tracks than in states with
slow foreclosure procedures, relative to servicers of delinquent loans held in portfolio.
Piskorski et al., supra note 130, at 16-17.
169. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern & Adam J. Levitin, Rewriting Frankenstein
Contracts: Workout Prohibitions in Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities, 82 S. CAL. L.
REv. 1075, 1088 (2009).
170. Credit Suisse, The Day After Tomorrow: Payment Shock and Loan
Modifications 6 (2007) (on file with Author); John P. Hunt, What Do Subprime
Securitization Contracts Actually Say About Loan Modification? Preliminary Results and
Implications 7 (Berkeley Ctr. Law & Econ., Working Paper, 2009), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/SubprimeSecuritizationContracts_3.25.09.pdf. Among
other things, this has the salutary benefit of allowing servicers to contact borrowers before
any payments are missed to determine the borrower's ability to handle the new payments
and, if not, to explore other options.
171. Credit Suisse, supra note 170, at 6; see also Hunt, supra note 170, at 7.
172. See Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al.'s "Preventive
Servicing Is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy": What Prevents
Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL' Y DEBATE 279, 287-88 (2007).
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any material loan modifications.17 3 The remaining PSAs do permit material loan
modifications, but only when they are in the best interest of investors.17 4 In such
cases, the servicer's precise latitude to negotiate a loan modification will depend
on the PSA. Many PSAs permit modification of all loans. About 35% of PSAs
limit modifications to 5% of the loan pool (measured by the loan amount or
number of loans). PSAs may contain other restrictions on loan modifications, such
as mandatory trial modification periods, use of specific resolution procedures, caps
on interest rate reductions, restrictions on the types of eligible loans, and limits on
the number of modifications in any one year.175
For the 90% or so of private-label securitizations that allow loan
modifications to some degree, it is questionable whether limits on those
modifications were binding. One survey of PSAs concluded that "large-scale
modification programs may be undertaken without violating the plain terms of
,,176PSAs in most cases. Even for securitizations that prohibit loan modifications
outright or cap them at 5%, some of those PSAs have been amended to allow more
modifications. 177 In addition, credit rating agencies no longer count modified loans
that are current 12 months after modification against the 5% cap where such a cap
exists.178 Consequently, it is doubtful that the limitations in PSAs per se explain
the low level of permanent loan modifications, at least for the 90% of securitized
trusts that allow modifications. While servicers face very real challenges in
complying with multiple PSAs containing a hodgepodge of provisions, for the
most part those agreements do not constrain their ability to modify distressed
loans.
E. Moral Hazard
Moral hazard concerns are another reason why servicers and investors
may resist loan modifications and principal reductions in particular. Servicers and
investors frequently voice fears that loan modifications will induce other
borrowers who are able to pay their mortgages to strategically default (or threaten
to default) in order to negotiate lower loan payments.179 When the debate over
173. Credit Suisse, supra note 170, at 5-6; see also Hunt, supra note 170, at 6.
174. Hunt, supra note 170, at 7-9. In general, any change in the principal balance,
the interest rate, or the final maturity will constitute a "material" modification. Id. at 7.
175. Credit Suisse, supra note 170, at 6 7, 20; Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 11.
176. Hunt, supra note 170, at 10. See also Adelino et al., supra note 40, at 13-18,
37 tbl.5; Thompson, supra note 136, at 6.
177. Most PSAs allow caps on loan modifications to be waived upon consent by a
rating agency or a bond insurer; only a few require investor approval. Kiff & Klyuev, supra
note 3, at 11. HAMP requires servicers to make reasonable efforts to obtain a waiver where
a PSA would otherwise prohibit a HAMP modification. Making Home Affordable
Program-MHA Extension and Expansion, Supplemental Directive 12-02, HOME
AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION PROGRAM 16 (Mar. 9, 2012), https://www.hmpadmin.com//por
tal/programs/docs/hamp-servicer/sdl2u2.pdf.
178. Thompson, supra note 136, at 6-7.
179. See, e.g., Brent W. Ambrose & Charles A. Capone, Jr., Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Single-Family Foreclosure Alternatives, 13 J. REAL EST. FIN. & EcON. 105, 107 (1996);
Quercia & Ding, supra note 82; Posner & Zingales, supra note 57, at 577.
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principal reduction began in 2011, there were growing concerns about strategic
default given that so many borrowers-over 11 million, or more than one out of
every five homeowners o-had underwater mortgages."' The extent of negative
equity, combined with fears of strategic default, make servicers especially
reluctant to reduce principal. This also helps explain the relatively low-albeit
growing-levels of principal modifications to date. Fears about strategic default by
currently paying borrowers also explain the rarity of loan modifications to
borrowers who claim they are at risk of imminent default.
Goodman et al. argued that the potential moral hazard from principal
reductions was less than expected because the number of borrowers who would
likely engage in strategic default had substantially declined by late 2011.
Additionally, there are techniques for managing moral hazard that do not require
turning down loan modifications altogether.' 8 2 One way is to limit loss mitigation
to borrowers with proven cash-flow problems. This requires full financial
disclosure to identify true hardship cases. Another technique, in the case of
principal modifications, is to design those modifications so as to discourage
redefault. For example, the special servicer Ocwen grants principal modifications
to underwater borrowers using three methods to reduce moral hazard. First, Ocwen
writes down eligible loans to 95% of the current appraised value, in order to
restore the borrower to positive equity and thus reduce incentives to default.
Second, one-third of the write-down is forgiven each year for three years, so long
as the borrower continues to perform. Finally, the borrower must agree to share
25% of any future home price appreciation with the investor.'8 3 Other times,
180. See, e.g., FED. RESERVE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 4; Press Release,
CoreLogic, CoreLogic Reports Negative Equity Increase in Q4 2011 1 (July 1, 2012),
available at http://www.corelogic.com/about-us/news/asset-upload-file365_15650.pdf.
181. Several studies found evidence of strategic default by deeply underwater
borrowers. See Goodman et al., supra note 85, at 35-41; Bajari et al., supra note 120, at 33-
34; Neil Bhutta, Jane Dokko & Hui Shan, Consumer Ruthlessness and Mortgage Default
During the 2007-2009 Housing Bust 3 5 (Dec. 2011) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1626969;
Ronel Elul, Nicholas S. Souleles, Souphala Chomsisengphet, Dennis Glennon & Robert
Hunt, What "Triggers" Mortgage Default? (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila. Research Dep't,
Working Paper No. 10-13, 2010), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-
and-data/publications/working-papers/2010/wplO-13.pdf; Haughwout et al., supra note 82,
at 3. But see Christopher L. Foote, Kristopher Gerardi & Paul S. Willen, Negative Equity
and Foreclosure: Theory and Evidence, 64 J. URB. ECON. 234, 234 (2009) (finding little
evidence of strategic default during the Massachusetts housing downturn in the early
1990s). This tendency is tempered, however, by underwater borrowers' deep aversion to
walking away from their mortgages until they reach high levels of negative equity. Bhutta,
supra, at 3 5; Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, The Determinants of Attitudes
Toward Strategic Default on Mortgages, 68 J. FIN. 1473, 1475 (2013); Luigi Guiso, Paola
Sapienza & Luigi Zingales, Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic Default on
Mortgages 2 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 15145, 2009), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5145.
182. See Goodman et al., supra note 85.
183. Jon Prior, Ocwen Unveils New Principal Reduction Program, HOUSING WIRE
(July 26, 2011, 11:37 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/news/2011/07/26/ocwen-unveils-
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servicers who write down principal may insist on short sales that require borrowers
to move out instead of granting principal reductions designed to keep borrowers in
their homes. This too is intended to discourage strategic defaults.' 84
In sum, moral hazard concerns are real. At the same time, servicers often
overstate these concerns and ignore design modifications that could discourage
moral hazard. The categorical nature of moral hazard objections by many servicers
suggests that something else is at work beyond moral hazard concerns themselves.
F. Tranche Warfare
In the debate over the reason for the low number of permanent
modifications, some commentators point to the fear of litigation from modifying
loans in private-label securitized portfolios. This hypothesis arises from the fact
that a servicer's decision to choose loan modification over foreclosure affects
tranches differently. Modifications that return loans to performing status benefit
the junior tranche by helping it avoid sustaining losses from foreclosure. At the
same time, modifications that cut the monthly payments hurt the senior tranches by
reducing their revenue stream. Instead, senior tranche holders may prefer
foreclosure because the junior tranche will absorb the loss first while the senior
tranche holders will often receive their principal back in full.'
These dynamics have fueled speculation that servicers avoid loan
modifications to limit the risk of "tranche warfare," i.e., lawsuits against them by
tranche holders.186 There is scant evidence that tranche warfare has been a real
impediment to loan modifications. Few, if any, investors have sued servicers to
date for agreeing to loan modifications. In part, this is because of safe harbor
protection and also because a sufficient number of investors must consent before
suit can be filed.187 Meanwhile, servicers report that investors rarely question
workouts, examine NPV calculations, or even threaten to bring a lawsuit. 88
new-principal-reduction-program-0. Posner & Zingales advanced a similar equity sharing
proposal. Posner & Zingales, supra note 57, at 575.
184. Thompson, supra note 136, at 9.
185. Kiff & Klyuev, supra note 3, at 11-12.
186. Eggert, supra note 172, at 290-91.
187. Thompson, supra note 136, at 8. The PSAs for certain Countrywide
securitizations contained a unique clause allowing Countrywide to modify up to 5% of the
loan pool in dollar terms only if Countrywide bought back the modified loans from the loan
pool. Hunt, supra note 170, at 9-10. In Greenwich Financial Services Distressed Mortgage
Fund 3, L.LC. v. Countrywide Financial Corporation, No. 650474/2008 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,
N.Y. Cty., filed 2008), an investor in a securitized Countrywide trust sued Countrywide to
force it to buy back any loans that it modified under a settlement agreement with state
attorneys general. Despite surface appearances, the Greenwich suit is not an actual case of
tranche warfare because Greenwich concurred that Countrywide had the latitude to modify
the loans. Instead, Greenwich simply demanded that Countrywide buy back the loans it
modified pursuant to its agreement. Thompson, supra note 136, at 42 n.48. Another
anomalous case revolved around a serious of lawsuits between the Carrington hedge fund as
the residual trancheholder of MBS and American Home Mortgage Servicing, the servicer.
Carrington had negotiated a PSA provision called the "rights of the CE holder" that allowed
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The safe harbor likely contributed to the relative quiet on the tranche
warfare front. In 2008 and 2009, Congress alleviated any concern that tranche
warfare might affect servicers' attitudes toward loan modifications by enacting a
safe harbor for servicers from investor suits for modifications that comport with
standard industry practice or government modification programs.'89 These
statutory provisions did not raise the level of loan modifications in any obvious
way, reinforcing the conclusion that tranche warfare is not the reason for low
levels of loan modifications.
G. Accounting Treatment
The choice of workout techniques can also have consequences for the
accounting treatment of loans and the need for write-downs. Current accounting
rules make servicers reluctant to reduce principal and interest. These rules also
encourage servicers to grant temporary modifications instead of permanent ones.
Financial Accounting Standard 15 ("FAS 15"), on troubled debt
restructurings, is the main accounting standard on point. Under that provision,
permanent reductions of principal or interest for troubled loans require immediate
write-downs. To the extent the servicer owns the residual tranche or the loans in
portfolio, it will likely absorb all or part of that loss.190 In contrast, temporary
modifications do not trigger the need for any write-down. Thus, FAS 15
encourages temporary loan modifications over permanent ones and short-term
repayment plans with dubious success rates over modifications that permanently
reduce principal or interest.191
it to determine the foreclosure and foreclosure sales process for every loan Carrington
bought from the originators. After American Home declined to enforce the rights of the CE
holder clause, Carrington sued to enforce the provision. Jacob Gaffney, Straight Up: The
Vindication of Carrington Mortgage Services, HOUSING WIRE (Aug. 2012),
http://www.housingwire.com/articles/straight-vindication-carrington-mortgage-
services?v=preview. Unlike the typical tranche warfare scenario involving passive
investors, here the dispute was between the servicer and an investor who asserted his own
ability to directly service distressed loans.
188. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 22 23.
189. HOPE for Homeowners Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 122 Stat. 2654;
Helping Families Save Their Homes Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-22, 123 Stat. 1632
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639a).
190. See Engel & McCoy, supra note 154, at 2047.
191. Thompson, supra note 136, at 12-14, 22; see also Piskorski et al., supra note
130, at 37 fig.3. A short-term repayment plan suspends terms or full monthly payment
requirements for a brief period of time to allow the borrower to catch up on missed
payments. After the period expires, the payment schedule reverts to the original schedule for
the mortgage. In 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission laid to rest a separate
question surrounding the accounting treatment of modified loans. Under FAS 140, a
securitized pool limited to assets that are "passive in nature" receives two benefits. The loan
pool is protected from claims by creditors against the underwriter or sponsor of the loan
pool. In addition, the transferor of the assets does not need to hold capital against those
loans. Previously, there had been concern that modifying loans before they became
delinquent would disqualify a loan pool from favorable treatment under FAS 140. In a letter
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FAS 15 is likely another reason why permanent HAMP modifications
lagged, because permanent modifications of distressed loans impose a stiff added
cost in the form of loss recognition. Additionally, servicers subject to federal
banking regulation may avoid write-downs of their distressed loans in order to
preserve capital'92 and avoid the need for additional loan loss reserves. 93 Servicers
are especially prone to act this way when they think they can avoid or postpone a
markdown by rejecting a loan modification request.
However, federal banking regulators have authority to require write-
downs of distressed loans anyway, even before consideration of a modification.194
When regulators are vigilant about enforcing the accounting standards for
distressed loans, they can help equalize the accounting treatment for distressed
loans without regard to modification and make servicers more receptive to
workouts. In July 2012, for instance, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency
brought this issue to a head by amending the OCC's bank accounting standards to
require write-downs if the servicer no longer expected principal and interest to be
paid in full on particular loans.195 The ruling applied to national banks and federal
savings associations, which accounted for at least 60% of the nation's servicing
industry. In response to the ruling, JP Morgan Chase & Co. and Wells Fargo & Co.
wrote down almost $1.4 billion on distressed home-equity and mortgage loans in
third quarter 2012 and moved another $3.1 billion in distressed home loans to
nonaccrual status.' 96 Other major servicers followed suit.197 That quarter, after the
dated July 24, 2007, however, then-Securities and Exchange Commission Chairman
Christopher Cox wrote Congressman Barney Frank, then Chairman of the House Banking
Committee, assuring Frank that modifications before delinquency would comply with FAS
140 so long as default was "reasonably foreseeable." Alan Rappeport, Prodded by
Congress, Cox Finds Flexibility in FAS 140, CFO, (July 27, 2007),
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/9564784?f=related.
192. See Posner & Zingales, supra note 57, at 599; Cordell et al., Myths and
Realities, supra note 6, at 21, 24-25; Haughwout et al., supra note 82, at 25-28. Capital
must be held against loans held in portfolio and loan modifications may require more
capital. See Regulatory Capital Rules: Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets,
Market Discipline and Disclosure Requirements, 77 Fed. Reg. 52,888, 52,900 (Aug. 30,
2012) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt.324). In addition, the anticipated capital treatment of
mortgage servicing rights under Basel III may affect the profitability of servicing
operations. See FED. RESERVE, WHITE PAPER, supra note 3, at 7.
193. Under FAS 15, permanent concessions to allay a borrower's financial
difficulties must be treated as troubled debt restructurings in order to preserve the
bankruptcy-remote status of a securitized trust. Anything classified as a troubled debt
restructuring requires the establishment of additional loan loss reserves under FAS 114.
194. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NR 2012-114, BANK
ACCOUNTING ADVISORY SERIES UPDATED (July 25, 2012); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF
THE CURRENCY, BANK ACCOUNTING ADVISORY SERIES 10-11 (2012), available at
http://www.occ.gov/publications/publications-by-type/other-publications-reports/baas.pdf.
195. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, NR 2012-114, BANK
ACCOUNTING ADVISORY SERIES UPDATED, supra note 194.
196. Dawn Kopecki & Michael J. Moore, JP Morgan, Wells Fargo Write Down
Home-Equity Loans, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 12, 2012, 1:11 PM),
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largest OCC-regulated servicers had taken those write-downs, the number of
portfolio loans held by the largest thrifts and national banks that received an
interest rate reduction, principal reduction, or term extension rose.198
To conclude, servicers' desire to avoid write-offs, higher capital
requirements, and additional loan loss reserves poses a powerful barrier to loan
modifications. More aggressive enforcement by banking examiners of the
accounting standards for distressed loans can help level the playing field by
eliminating any accounting advantage for denying loss mitigation.
H. Junior Mortgages
Distressed junior mortgages are also cited as an obstacle to loan
modifications. Over half of outstanding U.S. mortgages have junior liens.199
Borrowers with private-label first mortgages are especially likely to have junior
liens. Over half of private-label mortgages had second liens at year-end 2009,
compared to 18% of GSE loans. 2 00 Similarly, junior liens are prevalent in
borrowers with negative equity, which comes as no surprise since junior liens
boost combined loan-to-value ratios. As of the fourth quarter of 2011, 4.4 million
underwater borrowers had second liens, with an average combined loan-to-value
ratio of 138%.201
In situations involving a second lien, the total debt-to-income ratio post-
modification may still be too high for a distressed borrower to manage unless the
second lien is modified along with the first. HAMP statistics confirm that this
problem is real, reporting a high average back-end DTI ratio of 52.4% following
tier 1 HAMP modifications in February 2013.202 Since first mortgages with junior
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-12/occ-forced-jpmorgan-wells-fargo-to-write-
down-home-equity-loans.html.
197. See, e.g., Press Release, Bank of America, Bank of America Reports Third-
Quarter 2012 Net Income of $340 Million, or $0.00 per Share (Oct. 17, 2012),
http://investor.bankofamerica.com/phoenix.zhtml?c=71595&p=irol-newsArticle&ID=1746
326&highlight=#fbid=djajsUTft L; Press Release, Citigroup Inc., Citigroup Report Third
Quarter 2012 Earnings per Share of $0.15; $1.06 Excluding CVA/DVA, on MSSB and Tax
Benefit (Oct. 15, 2012), available at
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/investor/data/qer312.pdf?ieNocache=391.
198. Compare OCC MORTGAGE METRICS REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra
note 113, at 28, with OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC MORTGAGE
METRICS REPORT, SECOND QUARTER 2012 30 (2012). While the mortgage servicing
settlement probably also played a role in the surge, Wells Fargo cited the OCC's write-
down ruling as one reason for its write-down. See Kopecki & Moore, supra note 196.
199. Compare Laurie S. Goodman, Roger Ashworth, Brian Landy & Ke Yin,
Second Liens: How Important?, 20 J. FIXED INCOME 19, 20 (2010), with Donghoon Lee,
Christopher Mayer & Joseph Tracy, A New Look at Second Liens 4 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
N.Y.C., Staff Report No. 569, 2012).
200. Goodman et al., supra note 199, at 20.
201. Press Release, CoreLogic, supra note 180, at 2.
202. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY 2013,
supra note 75, at 6.
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liens default more often than first mortgages without 2 03 -and since negative equity
is a strong predictor of default 204-Workouts of junior mortgages are critical to a
comprehensive solution to the backlog of distressed mortgages.
The ownership pattern for junior liens creates the potential for principal-
agent conflicts for servicers of first-lien securitized mortgages. In the first quarter
of 2011, securitized trusts held only 2% of the outstanding $929 billion in closed-
end junior mortgages and home equity lines of credit ("HELOCs"). That same
quarter, four of the nation's largest banks-Bank of America, Wells Fargo, JP
Morgan Chase, and Citigroup-held 43% of all outstanding closed-end mortgages
and HELOCs in portfolio. Other depository institutions and credit unions held
most of the rest. 205
The predominance of banks as owners of junior liens creates principal-
agent conflicts for banks that service other investors' private-label first liens plus
their own junior liens. Investors argued that servicers should write down their own
second liens before modifying distressed private-label first liens.2 06 However,
servicers were reluctant to do so, at least until the 2012 OCC ruling on accounting
treatment discussed earlier, 2 07 because write-downs would have reduced their
earnings as well as bank capital. The capital implications were significant, in view
of the fact that total outstanding second mortgages on banks' books equaled over
half of all bank capital in 2011.208
Evidence suggests that this principal-agent problem is real and that junior
liens impede loan modification. In general, it is difficult to study the effect of the
presence of junior liens on a distressed homeowner's prospects for loan
modification because most datasets do not allow researchers to identify which
second liens are linked to particular first-lien loans. One innovative study of New
York City loans was able to overcome that hurdle, however, and found that first-
lien mortgages with junior liens were less likely to be modified than first-liens
with none. 2 09 Another study reported that junior liens were 11.3% less likely to be
modified,2 1 0 which suggests that distressed borrowers with junior liens have more
difficulty in negotiating a comprehensive loan modification package.
203. Goodman et al., supra note 199, at 20, 22-25.
204. See, e.g., Bajari et al., supra note 120, at 32-33; Bhutta et al., supra note
181, at 1; Elul et al., supra note 181, at 2, 8; Haughwout et al., supra note 82, at 1-3.
205. Goodman et al., supra note 85, at 38-40; see also Goodman et al., supra note
199, at 25-27.
206. See, e.g., Al Yoon, Mortgage Investors See Headway on 2"-Liens, REUTERS
(Apr. 12, 2010, 6:39 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/04/12/us-mortgages-
investors-idUSTRE63B63F20100412.
207. See supra Part IV.G.
208. Lee et al., supra note 199, at 2.
209. Sewin Chan, Claudia Sharygin, Vicki Been & Andrew Haughwout,
Pathways After Default: What Happens to Distressed Mortgage Borrowers and Their
Homes? 5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 281, 2011).
210. Sumit Agarwal, Gene Amromin, Itzhak Ben-David, Souphala
Chomsisengphet & Douglas D. Evanoff, Market Based Loss Mitigation Practices for
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There are several reasons why first-lien loan modifications are harder to
negotiate with junior liens present. A surprising proportion of junior liens continue
to perform after borrowers default on their first mortgages.211 Other junior liens are
both underwater and delinquent and thus often lack real worth apart from possible
recourse or demanding payment from the first lienholder in order to approve a
212
workout. Junior lienholders may perceive leverage in that situation. Although
many legal commentators believe that term extensions, interest rate reductions, and
principal write-downs on first-lien loans do not require junior lienholders'
approval, the rights of junior lien holders "have not been fully worked out in the
common law." 2 1 3 For this reason, first lien holders generally require junior lien
holders to sign an agreement to continue to subordinate their claims before
agreeing to modify a first mortgage. As a further complication, there is no central
registry of junior liens, making obtaining assent impossible if the junior lien holder
cannot be found. Even when they can be located, junior lien holders are often
reluctant to agree or demand several thousand dollars in payments in order to
resubordinate.2 14
HAMP offers a second lien modification program ("2MP") to pay
servicers to modify or extinguish second mortgages, but participation is voluntary.
As of February 2013, only six of the nine largest servicers participated in the
215
second lien program. The Obama administration predicted that 2MP would help
up to 1.5 million borrowers,2 1 6 but so far 2MP barely made a dent in the second-
lien problem: As of February 2013, 107,400 second lien modifications had been
started under 2 MP and only 27,296 second liens had been extinguished.2 1 7
Without more-and especially without resolving banks' accounting and capital
concerns-HAMP subsidies will not be enough to untie the Gordian knot of junior
liens.
Troubled Mortgages Following the Financial Crisis 13, 33 tbl.3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of
Chi., Working Paper No. 2011-03, 2010).
211. See Goodman et al., supra note 199, at 28; Julapa Jagtiani & William W.
Lang, Strategic Defaults on First and Second Lien Mortgages During the Financial Crisis,
20 J. FIXED INCOME 7, 7 (2011); Lee et al., supra note 199, at 7.
212. See Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 27.
213. Patrick A. Randolph, Jr., & Edwin F. Pierson, Mortgage Modification and
Alteration of Priorities Between Junior and Senior Lienholders (Jan. 28, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript), available at dirt.umkc.edu/alterationofpriorities.htm. A first lienholder may
forfeit senior status for increasing the interest rate but not for decreasing it. Increasing the
principal balance will also often lead to forfeiture. Extending or shortening the payment
schedule will usually not jeopardize senior status. Id.
214. Cordell et al., Myths and Realities, supra note 6, at 26-27.
215. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY 2013,
supra note 75, at 16, 18.
216. Second Lien Modification Program (2MP): Overview, HOME AFFORDABLE
MODIFICATION PROGRAM, https://www.hmpadmin.com//portal/programs/secondlienjsp
(last viewed Aug. 3, 2013).
217. U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY, MHA PERFORMANCE THROUGH FEBRUARY 2013,
supra note 75, at 5.
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L Tax Considerations
Previously, there was concern that tax considerations might have played a
role in loan modification decisions, but those considerations have been allayed by
the Internal Revenue Service. Virtually all securitized trusts are structured as pass-
through entities under the Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduit ("REMIC")
provisions of the Internal Revenue Code to avoid double federal income tax
liability. 2 18 At one time, it was thought that the REMIC tax rules penalized loan
modifications. 2 1 9 This concern arose from the fact that REMICs must be limited to
static loan pools to keep their tax-favored status. Servicers feared that loan
modifications would destroy the static nature of the loan pool. On May 16, 2008,
however, the Internal Revenue Service laid this concern to rest by ruling that loan
modifications for owner-occupied homes would not endanger REMIC status so
long as the loan was in default or the servicer reasonably believed there was a
significant risk of default. In addition, under the IRS ruling, any modification had
to follow a standard protocol in order to receive this tax-favored status. 2 2 0 Due to
this IRS ruling, tax considerations no longer pose a significant obstacle to
modifications of distressed home loans.
V. THE REAL OBSTACLES TO LOAN MODIFICATIONS
During the early years of the crisis, there was rampant speculation about
the obstacles to worthwhile loan modifications. Six years out, we are now in a
better position to identify the real friction points and to implement measures to
address them. The most powerful impediments to loan modifications are the
current system of servicer compensation, the presence of junior liens, and the
accounting treatment of permanent loan modifications.
Economic studies suggest that principal-agent problems in the private-
label securitization market create a bias toward foreclosures and against loan
modifications. The real question is, why? One of the leading causes is our current
broken compensation system for private-label servicing. These same perverse
incentives affect GSE compensation arrangements for servicers, albeit to a lesser
extent. In addition, the high-cost nature of loss mitigation encourages going to
foreclosure, regardless of the type of investor. Indeed, as the recent federal
enforcement actions showed, this dynamic was so strong that numerous servicers
resorted to robo-signing and other disreputable foreclosure practices in order to
spare expense, regardless of whether the loans in question were private-label loans,
GSE loans, or loans held in portfolio.
Another widely aired theory, involving restrictions on modifications in
PSAs, lost credence over time. It is true that those restrictions present
218. See, e.g., Thompson, supra note 136, at 9.
219. See, e.g., id. at 9-10. See generally Michael S. Barr & James A. Feldman,
Issue Brief Overcoming Legal Barriers to the Bulk Sale of At-Risk Mortgages, CENTER FOR
Am. PROGRESS, Apr. 2008, available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2008/04/pd
f/reimc brief.pdf.
220. Rev. Proc. 08-28, 2008-23 I.R.B. 6; see also Rev. Proc. 07-02, 2007-52
I.R.B. 6.
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administrative headaches for servicers and prove binding in a small minority of
cases. Additionally, some PSAs prohibit principal reductions despite allowing
other types of modifications. However, most PSAs give wide latitude for loan
modifications, including principal reductions,221 and do not pose significant
hurdles to intelligent workouts.
Similarly, early concerns about adverse tax implications and tranche
warfare by investors did not pan out. In contrast, servicer delays in recognizing
losses under accounting rules were a powerful impediment to optimal levels of
loan modifications. These efforts to avoid loss recognition fueled servicers'
preference for temporary modifications over permanent ones and were a powerful
reason why the largest banks resisted write-downs of their worthless second
mortgages.
When servicers grant loan modifications, their compensation system and
concerns about accounting treatment cause them to prefer types of modifications
with higher redefault rates. If servicers were truly concerned about minimizing
redefault rates on loan modifications, they would make principal reductions a
priority and avoid capitalizing arrears. However, virtually all loan workouts
capitalize arrears, even though that increases the risk of redefault. Similarly, fixed
servicing fees and accounting rules-combined with restrictions in some PSAs, the
Federal Housing Finance Agency's opposition to principal reductions for GSE
loans, and many servicers' unwillingness to use design elements in principal
modifications to reduce moral hazard-have all slowed the adoption of principal
forbearance and forgiveness. As a result, interest rate reductions have outpaced
principal reductions, probably because fixed servicing fees and default fees have a
neutral effect on servicers' incentives to cut interest rates.
There are three reasons why we need to care about the barriers to
foreclosure prevention. First, needless foreclosures inflict heavy losses on
borrowers, investors, and communities that could otherwise be avoided with well-
designed loan modifications. Second, removing unnecessary obstacles to interest
rate and principal reductions will produce loan modifications with higher success
rates. Finally, the right diagnosis is important because the policy response depends
on what needs to be fixed.
First and foremost among those policy responses is servicer compensation
reform, which still has not occurred. Today's system pays too much to servicers
for servicing current loans and too little for crafting workouts. Going forward,
servicer compensation needs to be overhauled to cover the cost of competent loss
mitigation activities and to reward servicers for granting workouts, when
appropriate, of loans in default. Properly paying servicers for approving NPV-
positive loan modifications would go a long way toward avoiding another wave of
needless foreclosures. In coming years, as policymakers debate whether to wind
221. The recent spurt in private-label principal reductions shows that many PSAs
allow them. See Goodman et al., supra note 87, at 57; see also OCC MORTGAGE METRICS
REPORT, FOURTH QUARTER 2012, supra note 113, at 28 tbl.20.
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222down the GSEs and privatize the system of housing finance, a window of
opportunity will open to adopt those reforms.
Concerns about accounting treatment and loss recognition are another
major impediment to modifications of certain types of loans. This problem affects
portfolio loans and securitized loans in particular where the servicers hold the
residual tranches. Relaxing the accounting rules for troubled debt restructurings is
not the answer, because doing so would undermine the transparency and reliability
of servicers' financial statements. Instead, auditors and regulators need to put
consistent pressure on servicers to mark down distressed loans promptly. There
was a noticeable uptick in loan modifications-particularly in interest rate and
principal reductions, with their lower redefault rates-after the Comptroller
insisted on more aggressive write-downs for troubled loans. Prompt write-offs of
impaired and worthless loans will also remove the obstacle to workouts that
distressed junior loans now pose.
Finally, the wide variation in loss mitigation records for different
223
servicers cries out for attention. As the financial crisis showed, unnecessary
foreclosures inflict devastating costs on surrounding communities. These costs are
too high to entrust loss mitigation to private contracting alone. Instead, the time
has come to incorporate the lessons of the foreclosure crisis into the servicing
industry's institutional design. In particular, pooling and servicing agreements and
other comparable servicing guidelines must be rewritten to adopt the aspects of
HAMP that worked, particularly: the standardized waterfall, the stress on early
intervention, and the emphasis on lower monthly payments, including through
principal reduction. Similarly, PSAs and seller/servicer guidelines should be
altered to include principal reduction as a permissible loss mitigation method.
Right now, the federal government has a historic opportunity to
accomplish these changes because our system of housing finance is in dire need of
reform. Whichever direction housing reform takes, the federal government needs
to seize the opportunity to standardize loss mitigation protocols going forward. If,
for example, housing finance continues to be conducted by federal
instrumentalities-as it is for the most part today-then the federal government
will have the power, by virtue of its control over those instrumentalities, to require
them to incorporate the beneficial lessons from HAMP's design and the principal
reduction experience into their servicing guidelines going forward. Alternatively,
if the federal government dismantles the GSEs in favor of private-label
securitization, investor demand for more effective loss mitigation protocols, plus
the probable need for a federal guarantee for catastrophic loss,224 will create a
222. See, e.g., DEP'T OF THE TREASURY AND DEP'T OF Hous. AND URBAN DEV.,
REFORMING AMERICA'S HOUSING FINANCE MARKET 24 (2011), available at
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/documents/reforming%20america's%20housing%20fina
nce%20market.pdf.
223. See, e.g., Goodman et al., supra note 87, at 57-59; Agarwal et al., supra note
85, at 15, 28; Been et al., supra note 130, at 7; Collins & Herbert, supra note 86, at 11.
224. See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POL'Y CTR., HOUSING AMERICA'S FUTURE: NEW
DIRECTIONS FOR NATIONAL POLICY 50 58 (2013), available at http://bipartisanpolicy.org/
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prime opportunity to write optimal foreclosure prevention standards into the PSAs
of the future. However the housing finance system is reformed, it is crucial for
regulators, investors, the servicing and securitization industries, and the public at
large to take this opportunity to institutionalize the changes needed to improve
foreclosure prevention for once and for good.
sites/default/files/BPCHousing%20Report-webO.pdf; MORTGAGE FIN. WORKING GROUP,
A RESPONSIBLE MARKET FOR HOUSING FINANCE 1-7 (2009), available at
http://www.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/issues/2009/12/pdf/housing-finance.
pdf.

